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ABSTRACT 
 Saudi Arabia and Israel have never had formal diplomatic relations. The 
Arab-Israeli issue of Palestinian self-determination, above all else, has kept these two 
Middle East states apart and at times in adversarial tension. However, the 21st century 
has witnessed thawing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, despite the continued 
unpopularity of Israel within Saudi society. Scholars have largely isolated one or two of 
the primary drivers that promote or inhibit Saudi’s desire to cooperate with 
Israel—mutual concern with Iran, Saudi reform initiatives, and U.S. influence—without 
analyzing how the factors work in tandem to promote or inhibit cooperation as a whole. 
This thesis examines how those drivers interact to provide a more holistic understanding 
of why Saudi Arabia would cooperate with Israel, and the implications of those drivers 
on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This thesis concludes that in the present 
configuration, the drivers of Saudi’s cooperation initiatives with Israel collectively have 
not stimulated a viable path to normalization of relations that circumvents the barrier of 
Palestinian self-determination. This thesis also concludes that this barrier is 
predominantly the result of Saudi Arab tradition and not borne out of religion. Saudi 
Arabia and Israel will continue to cooperate towards mutually beneficial opportunities 
short of normalization for as long as the strategic context of their relationship endures. 
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Saudi Arabia and Israel have never had formal diplomatic relations. The Arab-
Israeli issue of Palestinian self-determination, above all else, has kept these two Middle 
East states apart and at times in adversarial tension. Israel’s very existence has long been 
criticized by its neighboring Muslim Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia. However, the 
21st century has witnessed thawing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi 
Arabia has increased cooperation with a country that many of its people and allies view as 
an enemy of Islam and the Arab people. Why would Saudi Arabia potentially jeopardize 
its own legitimacy by cooperating with Israel?  
Additionally, between September and October 2020, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Bahrain, and Sudan signed landmark initiatives under the Abraham Accords for 
full normalization with Israel. However, these normalization agreements focused 
international attention on the historic tension associated with Arab states establishing 
relations with Israel. Since Israel’s inception in 1948, the legitimacy of its existence has 
been contested by its predominantly Muslim Arab neighboring countries. The contention 
emerges from Israel’s policies toward Palestinians and occupation of Palestinian territory, 
including the holy city of Jerusalem. After decades of exchanging harsh rhetoric and 
Israel’s human rights record against Palestinians, it is strange that three Arab countries 
signed normalization initiatives with Israel without Israel conceding territory to the 
Palestinians or shared custody of the holy sites. Immediately following the signing of the 
2020 Abraham Accords, media outlets rationalized the normalization agreements through 
explanations of Arab countries balancing their military power against Iran, as well as 
allegations of the United States bribing signatories with advanced military technology.1 
The media then highlighted that Saudi Arabia could be next to normalize.  
 
1 Neri Zilber, “Peace for Warplanes?,” Foreign Policy (blog), August 31, 2020, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/08/31/israel-uae-peace-deal-f-35-arms-sales-palestine/; Jonathan Hoffman, 
“Analysis ; Why Gulf Nations Are Normalizing Ties with Israel,” Washington Post, September 24, 2020 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/24/why-gulf-nations-are-normalizing-ties-with-israel/. 
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My thesis examines what factors have kept Saudi Arabia and Israel from officially 
normalizing relations, investigates what has driven Saudi Arabia’s evolving relationship 
and increased cooperation initiatives and with Israel since 2001, and briefly explores the 
feasibility of a potential normalization agreement between the two countries in the future. 
While there has been significant research into Saudi and Israel’s evolving relationship over 
time, scholars have largely isolated one or two of the factors that promote or inhibit 
cooperation without analyzing how the factors work in tandem to promote or inhibit 
cooperation. This thesis seeks to rigorously examine how those factors interact for a more 
holistic understanding of what Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship hinges on now and in 
the future. This thesis will not argue whether or not Saudi and Israel will normalize 
relations in the future, but instead will look at how Saudi’s increased cooperation and 
diplomacy with Israel in the 21st century is a balancing act for Saudi Arabia to further its 
security interests while maintaining its religious and political legitimacy within Arab 
societies and the wider Muslim world. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
After decades of animosity, why has Saudi Arabia increased diplomatic 
negotiations and cooperation with Israel? Does this increased strategic cooperation signal 
a viable pathway to official normalization of relations in the future? 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The Middle East continues to play a pivotal role in United States foreign policy, 
and Saudi Arabia and Israel endure as major U.S. partners in the region. However, we 
typically work with them bilaterally, and separate lines of effort between Saudi Arabia and 
Israel. If there are shifting balances of power, especially between these two unexpected 
countries that are both strong partners of the United States, analysts need to grasp what the 
evolving relationship hinges on. Analysts then need to clearly articulate that new dynamic 
to civilian and military decisionmakers to appropriate inform U.S. foreign policy 
initiatives. Furthermore, shifting dynamics between Saudi Arabia and Israel also illuminate 
what U.S. actions in the region could derail our foreign policy initiatives. Our actions and 
inactions in the region have consequences. Perhaps instead of partnering with Saudi Arabia 
3 
and Israel separately, there is an opportunity for a stronger and clearer multilateral effort 
against common security considerations.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature on Saudi Arabia and Israel’s warming relations during the 21st 
century focuses on three causal mechanisms: mutual concern with Iran, Saudi’s secular 
reform initiatives, and U.S. influence. Scholars agree that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
the largest impediment to full normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. However, 
they diverge on whether or not normalization is even possible in light of the unsettled 
Palestinian issue. This literature review explores the impact of all three separate causal 
mechanisms on cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as how scholars 
diverge on the feasibility of Saudi Arabia and Israel establishing full normalization in the 
future without Palestinian self-determination.  
1. Palestinian Self-Determination
Since 1948, Saudi Arabia and Israel have maintained a pragmatic, yet strained 
relationship. The Palestinian issue has divided them, and Saudi Arabia has at times 
communicated its support to the Palestinian cause through harsh rhetoric and criticism of 
Israeli policies.2 Saudi avoided direct involvement during the Arab-Israeli wars, but has 
played a leading regional role and promoted proactive policies aimed at resolving the crisis 
since the early 1980s.3 In brokering the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) between Israel 
and Palestine, Saudi made a significant step in recognizing Israel’s security concerns 
emanating from the Palestinian population. However, its official requirement for 
Palestinian self-determination as a pre-requisite to normalization with Israel endures.4 
2 Elie Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel: From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948–2018,” The Middle 
East Journal 72, no. 4 (Autumn 2018): 584, http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.3751/72.4.12. 
3 Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel: From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948–2018,” 584. 
4 Podeh, 585. 
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2. Mutual Iranian Threat
While the Palestinian issue divides Saudi Arabia and Israel, their mutual concerns 
over Iran’s regional hegemonic aspirations have brought them closer together.5 Scholars 
largely accept that shared concern about Iran is the primary driver of cooperation between 
Israel and Saudi Arabia. Jacob Abadi emphasizes Saudi Arabia’s pragmatic approach to 
Israel, and Elie Podeh frames the relationship as a realist “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend” paradigm.6 Abadi explains that as Iranian influence penetrated Lebanon and 
encouraged Hamas in Gaza in the early 2000s, Saudi Arabia recognized Iran’s threat to its 
regional interests and traded confrontation for engagement with Israel.7 Despite Saudi 
Arabia and Israel’s history of hostility and distrust, Iran’s regional hegemonic aspirations 
have fostered cooperation between the two countries.8 Jonathan Rynhold and Michal Yaari 
similarly note that Saudi and Israel’s mutual alarm over the Iranian threat has increased as 
Iran’s military and political power has increased.9 
Rynhold and Yaari also point to the concern over Iran’s possible future 
development of nuclear weapons as a point of convergence between Saudi Arabia and 
Israel.10 Jones and Guzansky support this idea by referencing Saudi Arabia and Israel’s 
mutual objection to the 2015 nuclear deal that allowed Iran to fund its nuclear program 
through international donations while using its own resources to sustain regional proxy 
militia forces.11 Abadi also notes that despite failed Arab-Israeli peace negotiations in 2002 
and 2009, Saudi Arabia nevertheless maintained close contact with Israel out of concern 
5 Jacob Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 
Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 3 (May 4, 2019): 433. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1509853 
6 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 433; Podeh, 
“Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948–2018,” 585. 
7 Abadi, 443. 
8 Abadi, 433. 
9 Jonathan Rynhold and Michal Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 
Mediterranean Politics, December 6, 2019, 1. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2019.1699267 
10 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” Mediterranean Politics, 
December 6, 2019, 2. 
11 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 398–99, 411. 
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for Iran’s growing nuclear program.12 Abadi, Rynhold, and Yaari further point to the Saudi 
funding of Israeli intelligence operations against the Iranian nuclear program in 2012, as 
well as military sales and overflight permissions as evidence of upgraded Saudi-Israeli 
cooperation against Iran.13  
Lastly, scholars convey Saudi Arabia and Israel’s growing antipathy toward Iran 
and its Shia surrogates during the fallout of the 2003 Iraq War, the 2006 Israel-Hizballah 
War, and the Arab Spring as a reason for their warming relations.14 Resulting security 
vacuums fostered Gulf State fears of a Shia crescent comprising Iran-backed non-state 
actors and fostered Saudi’s benign attitude towards Israel.15 Rynhold and Yaari claim that 
Saudi views proxy conflicts within Arab states as a hegemonic rivalry between Saudi-
backed blocs and Iranian-backed blocs, perceiving Iranian blocs as gaining influence at the 
expense of Saudi’s Sunni allies.16 Israel converges with Saudi in recognizing the growing 
threat posed by the increased magnitude and proximity of Iran and its proxies in these 
countries.17 
3. Secular Reform Initiatives
Saudi Arabia wants to modernize and shed its hyper-conservative reputation.18 
Jones and Guzansky attribute Saudi’s fear of Iran’s revolutionary influence and sensitivity 
to its reputation as an extremist incubator following 9/11 to Riyadh’s promotion of a more 
moderate Saudi State.19 Rynhold and Yaari convey that the rise of Salafist Sunni groups 
and the Muslim Brotherhood following the Arab Spring brought Saudi Arabia and Israel 
12 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 443. 
13 Abadi, 443–44; Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 2. 
14 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 405, 411; Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and 
Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948–2018,” 564. 
15 Jones and Guzansky, 405–406; Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public 
Engagement, 1948–2018,” 575. 
16 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 2. 
17 Rynhold and Yaari, 2. 
18 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 406; Ben Hubbard, MBS: The Rise 
to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2020), xiv. 
19 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 406. 
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closer, especially as the uprisings deprived Saudi Arabia of its powerful Egyptian ally.20 
Since 2009, Riyadh has openly supported a range of nonstate actors to counter Sunni 
extremists and Iranian-sponsored proxy groups in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.21  
Furthermore, Rynhold and Yaari, as well as Guzansky credit the personal role of 
Saudi Crown, Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), as crucial in driving secular reform 
initiatives and cooperation initiatives with Israel.22 MBS has diverged from his father’s 
more traditional views set forth in the Arab Peace Initiative.23 Guzansky further contends 
that cooperation efforts with Israel match MBS’s efforts to market moderate Islam as part 
of Saudi’s reform initiatives.24 Guzansky further remarks that the likelihood of additional 
cooperation with Israel will increase in the event of King Salman’s death and MBS’s 
succession.25 However, MBS is cognizant of the impact of pushing for diplomacy with 
Israel on his impending appointment, as well as Saudi elite influence on both issues.26
Conversely, Rynhold and Yaari uphold that any potential future decline in MBS’s 
authority, or an overthrow of the Saud regime would severely degrade Saudi-Israeli 
rapprochement initiatives.27  
Rynhold and Yaari further claim that transnational Arab-Muslim identities are 
weakening the emphasis on the Palestinian issue, which lowers political and religious 
barriers to Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with Israel.28 Showcasing a growing fatigue with 
the Palestinian cause, Palestinian leadership fracturing and extremist ties, Iran poses more 
20 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 3. 
21 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 411. 
22 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 3; Yoel Guzansky, “Saudi 
Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” Institute for National Security Studies, no. 1396 (October 2020): 2, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep27809. 
23 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 3–4; Guzansky, “Saudi 
Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” 2. 
24 Guzansky, 4. 
25 Guzansky, 2, 4. 
26 Guzansky, 2. 
27 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 8. 
28 Rynhold and Yaari, 4,6. 
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of a security threat to Saudi Arabia than the Palestinian issue.29 Rynhold and Yaari 
characterize the last decade of Saudi-Israeli relations as a “quiet revolution,” that has 
“creat[ed] elbow room, in terms of domestic legitimacy and regime security, for the Saudi 
regime to take steps to develop relations with Israel.”30 Jones and Guzansky support this 
claim by contending that Saudi’s anti-Israel stance had as much to do with demonstrating 
a strong anti-Israel stance amongst Arab-Muslim peers as it did in advancing the 
Palestinian cause.31  
4. U.S. Influence (or Lack Thereof)
The United States and Saudi Arabia maintain a close relationship founded on a 
1945 agreement for the United States to protect Saudi Arabia from external attacks in 
exchange for access to Saudi oil.32 In parallel, America recognized the formation of Israel 
in 1948 and developed an enduring relationship over the decades, strengthened by military 
and economic cooperation.33 However, the U.S. preoccupation with its military campaigns 
in Afghanistan and Iraq since the early 2000s, and the resulting U.S. disinclination towards 
additional military engagements in the Middle East perpetuated Gulf state fears that the 
United States could not guarantee their security against Iran.34 U.S. pressure for the Saudi 
regime to move towards negotiations with the Jewish state, as well as the absence of U.S. 
willingness to counter Iran further drives Saudi Arabia towards cooperation with Israel. 
Abadi contends that the United States has historically moderated Saudi Arabia’s policies 
and deterred hostile aggression towards Israel due to Saudi’s desire to protect its 
longstanding relationship with the United States—its primary petroleum export client and 
supplier of sophisticated weapons systems.35 Guzansky claims that U.S. weapons exports 
29 Rynhold and Yaari, 2. 
30 Rynhold and Yaari, 1, 4, 6. 
31 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 405. 
32 Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 6. 
33 Charles Lipson, “American Support for Israel: History, Sources, Limits,” Israel Affairs 2, no. 3–4 
(March 1996): 128. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537129608719397 
34 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 407. 
35 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 445–446. 
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to Saudi Arabia is a favorable factor in increasing Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with Israel.36 
However, Jones and Guzansky, as well as Rynhold and Yaari note that Israel is particularly 
concerned with its military advantage in future U.S. arms sales (specifically nuclear 
technology) to Saudi Arabia.37  
Additionally, scholars contend that Saudi and Israel base their regional security 
strategies on the U.S. willingness and ability to project strategic leadership across the 
region, and more importantly, when the United States is unwilling or unable to do so.38 
Shared disdain over the Obama administration’s handling of Iran and its nuclear program, 
its abandonment of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt during the Arab Spring, and overall U.S. 
retrenchment caused Saudi Arabia and Israel to question the reliability of the United States 
as a long-standing patron.39 While the Trump administration improved relations with Saudi 
Arabia, it is unclear how a new Biden administration will alter this dynamic. In the absence 
of the United States or traditional Arab partners, Rynhold and Yaari contend that Israel’s 
political and military efforts to counter Iran have decisively altered Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
policy on Israel.40  
In the absence of viable partners, Saudi Arabia and Israel have formed what Jones 
and Guzansky call a tacit security regime (TSR) to further their hard power interests.41 The 
definition of TSR remains contested within scholarship as geostrategic interests and 
ideational factors determine the exact relationship between the involved actors. However, 
Jones and Guzansky define the concept of TSR as “how adversaries—who would 
otherwise normally eschew more formal means of diplomatic exchange—manage their 
relations through a series of informal agreements and understandings, where despite being 
unwritten and not codified, rules and boundaries in pursuit of wider shared interests are 
36 Guzansky, “Saudi Arabia and Normalization with Israel,” 5. 
37 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 8; Jones and Guzansky, 
“Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 414. 
38 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 399; Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet 
Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 2. 
39 Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 3. 
40 Rynhold and Yaari, 2–3. 
41 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 399. 
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readily understood.”42 Jones and Guzansky surmise that Saudi antipathy towards Israel 
endures amongst influential Saudis and the TSR between Saudi and Israel has boundaries 
that prevent a deeper and more permanent relationship. However, the TSR between Saudi 
and Israel continues to sidestep the intractable issue of Palestinian statehood and fluidly 
adapts to changes that domestic ideational context dictates.43  
5.  Prospect of Normalization
While most scholars recognize the political difficulties in Saudi Arabia and Israel 
establishing official normalization, there is a divergence in the literature on its feasibility. 
Abadi and Podeh reject the notion that Saudi Arabia would ever pursue normalization 
before the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is settled. In line with traditional scholarship on the 
issue, Abadi and Podeh predict that Saudi Arabia will not openly normalize with Israel 
prior to a solution (or at least significant progress towards a solution) in the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict.44 Despite unprecedented levels of military cooperation and 
commercial transactions between Saudi Arabia and Israel, Abadi and Podeh suggest that 
Palestinian self-determination is a fundamental and unchanged tenet of Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policy toward Israel.45 The latter scholars acknowledge Saudi’s seemingly 
intractable demands for Palestinian self-determination, coupled with Israel’s disinclination 
to negotiate with a weak Palestinian leadership.46 However, they offer evidence of subtle 
changes within Saudi leadership and domestic public opinion that could at the very least 
change the parameters of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement.  
A different view has been advanced by Jones and Guzansky, as well as Rynhold 
and Yaari. These scholars are more optimistic about the question of potential 
42 Jones and Guzansky, 399. 
43 Jones and Guzansky, 399, 403, 410, 412, 414. 
44 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 446; 
Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948–2018,” 585. 
45 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 433, 442, 
446; Podeh, “Saudi Arabia and Israel, From Secret to Public Engagement, 1948–2018,” 585. 
46 Jones and Guzansky, “Israel’s Relations with the Gulf States,” 413; Rynhold and Yaari, “The Quiet 
Revolution in Saudi-Israeli Relations,” 7–8. 
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normalization, stressing a qualitative shift and greater sensitivity in Riyadh’s recognition 
of the of the Jewish state’s legitimacy and its security concerns.47 Influential Saudis have 
become more open in their dealings with Israel and demonstrated “thinly veiled support” 
for Israel’s response to Palestinian activities.48 Guzansky recognizes Saudi Arabia’s 
various internal and external sensitivities and restraints to normalization based on 
maintaining internal stability and regional preeminence. He further acknowledges that full 
normalization may be one step too far for the kingdom, but sees Saudi preparing its 
domestic population through what he coins as “creeping normalization.”49 Guzansky 
admits that the price of normalization for Saudi Arabia is higher than its Gulf neighbors 
and it is unclear what conditions would allow for Saudi to sign an Abraham Accords style 
agreement.50 However, he also notes that Saudi intolerance towards Israel and its Jewish 
population emanates primarily from Saudis in exile that oppose the regime, whereas 
resident opinion is less clear due to censorship.51 Guzansky offers that Saudi’s support for 
the Abraham Accords (short of its own signing) and its increasingly positive state-owned 
media coverage of Israel show how far Saudi Arabia has deviated from its historical 
antipathy towards Israel.52 Saudi may exercise a more flexible approach in what defines a 
resolution, and is no longer muting its criticism against Palestinian leadership and 
responsibility in a failed Arab-Israeli peace.53 Jones and Guzansky conclude that 
ideological barriers make the TSR paradigm more viable for the foreseeable future and 
there is promise in the TSR’s confidence-building measures towards normalization.54  
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E. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND QUESTIONS EXPLORED 
This thesis seeks to explore why Saudi Arabia and Israel have ostensibly abandoned 
their historical animosities towards one another in exchange for increasing diplomacy and 
cooperation in the 21st century. Are we witnessing a political maturation of Saudi Arabia 
that overlooks political and religious indifferences with Israel for a greater cause? Is the 
United States failing to protect Saudi Arabia’s security interests and being replaced by a 
stronger guarantor in a realist self-help world? Does the Arab world believe that we 
brokered normalization in exchange for airplanes under the last presidential administration, 
and what does that signal to them in terms of our intentions in the region? More 
importantly, does a change to that deal under a new administration make us look weak and 
unreliable as a partner? Furthermore, it will briefly examine factors and trend lines that 
could suggest the possibility of Saudi Arabia and Israel reaching full normalization of 
relations without first settling the Arab-Israeli conflict. Based on a review of the literature, 
there are three causal mechanisms that advance cooperation between Saudi Arabia and 
Israel: mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s secular reform initiatives, and U.S. influence.  
This thesis seeks to explore how all three mechanisms interact to fuel increased 
cooperation between the two countries, but why they have fallen short of full 
normalization. This thesis will also briefly examine the shifting factors in Saudi domestic 
politics which could prepare the ground for the potential normalization of Saudi-Israeli 
relations at some point in the next five years without there being any sort of resolution to 
the question of Palestinian self-determination. Whichever path Saudi Arabia ultimately 
takes, it is likely that its policies will have to carefully balance any relationship with Israel 
with the potential consequences that improving ties could have on its domestic political 
situation and its broader legitimacy within the greater Muslim world.  
F. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis conducts a case study of Saudi Arabia and Israel’s warming relations 
from 2001 to the present. The timeframe was chosen to showcase the impact of increased 
U.S. involvement in the region, a surge of radical religious extremism, and Saudi Arabia’s 
recent move away from puritanical Salafism and greater support for religious moderation 
12 
under MBS. Additionally, in the conclusion, it will briefly consider the possibility of full 
normalization without settling the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian self-determination 
first. Research for this thesis will include both relevant secondary works, as well as current 
primary source materials. Secondary sources will include books, journal articles, 
government reports, and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports. Primary sources 
will include official Saudi, Israeli and U.S. statements, Western and Middle Eastern news 
reports, foreign government websites, Muslim clerical statements, social media of 
government officials, and other relevant resources. Research will be limited to works in or 
translated to English.  
G. THESIS CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. This first chapter encompassed the 
introduction. The second chapter discusses the historical factors impeding Saudi and Israeli 
normalization. The third chapter explores the impacts of mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s 
secular reform initiatives, and U.S. influence on increased cooperation between Saudi 
Arabia and Israel. The fourth chapter analyzes what conditions would further or inhibit 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The final chapter briefly discusses the 
feasibility of Saudi Arabia and Israel normalizing without Palestinian self-determination, 
and discusses thesis finding implications to scholarly debates and U.S. foreign policy in 
the Middle East. 
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II. WHAT KEEPS SAUDI ARABIA AND ISRAEL FROM 
NORMALIZING RELATIONS 
Before investigating the factors that promote Saudi Arabia’s increased 
contemporary cooperation with Israel, it is essential to understand what has inhibited their 
normalization of relations in the past, as well as the points of tension that endure today. 
Above all else, Saudi Arabia and Israel have long been divided by the Arab-Israeli issue of 
Palestinian self-determination—specifically, Israel’s oppressive policies toward 
Palestinians and occupation of Palestinian territory, to include the holy city of Jerusalem. 
This chapter discusses the historical factors that have divided Saudi Arabia and Israel on 
the Palestinian issue—to include Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi religious foundation, the Saudi 
monarchy’s traditional view of Israel and sense of responsibility to the Palestinian people, 
Saudi-led Arab-Israeli peace initiatives, relevant current events, and Saudi Arabia’s 
enduring requirement for Palestinian self-determination. These points of tension serve as a 
benchmark for the explanatory power of the factors that promote improved relations 
between the two countries—mutual concern with Iran, Saudi’s secular reform initiatives, 
and U.S. influence.  
A. HISTORICAL POINTS OF TENSION 
Religion in and of itself is not the ultimate source of Saudi Arabia and Israel’s 
ideological divergence. Instead, Saudi Arabia’s religious influences, in tandem with 
cultural and pragmatic political considerations, have guided Saudi’s foreign policy over 
time and constructed enduring barriers to cooperation with Israel. Wahhabism—a 
puritanical branch of Sunni Islam—is the official religion of Saudi Arabia, whereas 
Judaism is the official religion of Israel. While Wahhabism and Judaism are central to 
Saudi Arabia and Israel’s respective identities under opposing interpretations of 
monotheism, peaceful religious coexistence has long been tolerated in both countries. 
Saudi Arabia has also allowed for quietist practice of a wide variety of other religions as 
long as they do not infringe on the superiority and influence of Wahhabism.55 Religion is 
 
55 Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 52. 
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a critical pillar of the Saudi establishment, but is not irreconcilable with Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policy dealings with Israel. Instead, the pinnacle barrier between the modern states 
of Saudi Arabia and Israel over time is their political divergence on the legitimacy of Israel 
as a state, and Israel’s political and economic marginalization of the Palestinians. Saudi 
Arabia combines pragmatism with the House of Saud’s religiously-backed and culturally 
influenced perception of the Jewish and Palestinian people to shape Saudi’s foreign policy 
towards Israel. 
1. Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi Roots 
Saudi Arabia’s ruling monarchy derives and maintains its domestic political 
legitimacy from a 277-year alliance with the Wahhabi clergy, who continue to command 
the loyalty of millions of Sunni followers within Saudi Arabia and abroad.56 In 1744, the 
House of Saud—an Arab clan—pledged to uphold and spread Wahhabism across the 
Arabian peninsula in exchange for Islamic scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s 
granting the Saud family dominion over the land.57 The House of Saud gained political 
power and military authority as crusaders of Islam, whereas ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his 
descendants—the Al al-Shaikh—gained religious, moral, and educational authority over 
the Arabian Peninsula and its people.58 The House of Saud and Al al-Shaikh established 
themselves as “supreme but not absolute in [their] own spheres of authority,” with a system 
of checks and balances that mutually reinforce one another.59  
That said, three iterations of the Saudi state have witnessed pivotal growing pains 
in striking the right balance of Saudi power projection and Wahhabi religious zeal within 
the region. Under the first Saudi state, between 1744 and 1818, the House of Saud fervently 
imposed Wahhabism across the region by destroying the existing mosques, shrines and 
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Islamic practices that were not in line with Wahhabi teachings.60 Once the spread of 
Wahhabism threatened the political and religious legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan and 
caliph in Istanbul—the heart of the ruling Ottoman Empire—the sultan dispatched the 
Ottoman viceroy in Egypt, Muhammad Ali, to Arabia to attack the Saudi-Wahhabi forces. 
Muhammad Ali’s forces decimated the Saudi-Wahhabi capital at Al-Diriyya in 1818 and 
reverted the Arabian territories to their pre-Saudi-Wahhabi political and territorial 
fragmentation.61  
As a result, the second Saudi state between 1818 and 1891 lacked the first state’s 
unifying enthusiasm for Wahhabism and consequently crumbled from Saud family 
infighting and division amongst the military ranks.62 The Ottoman-backed House of 
Rashid—rivals to the House of Saud—took advantage of the Saud family’s infighting, 
defeated the Saudi tribes, and conquered Riyadh in 1890.63 However, exiled House of Saud 
prince Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Saud (better known to the West as King Ibn 
Saud) reinvigorated Wahhabi hegemony after reconquering Riyadh from the Rashid 
dynasty in 1902.64 Ibn Saud reestablished the Saud alliance with Al al-Shaikh (who 
provided religious justification for his rule), healed the House of Saud’s family rifts, and 
reinstated the Saudi dynasty to rule its territories—a precursor to the 1932 establishment 
of the third and current Saudi state.65 The third Saudi state has not been devoid of family 
infighting, as was evident from the ruling family’s 1964 removal and replacement of King 
Saud bin Abdulaziz Al Saud with his brother, King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. 
However, the Wahhabi clerical establishment has overseen all transitions of power and 
social reform within the third Saudi state.66  
 
60 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 58. 
61 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 59. 
62 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 59. 
63 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 59–60. 
64 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 60. 
65 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, 59–60; Hubbard, MBS: The Rise to Power of Mohammed Bin Salman, 6. 
66 Ayoob and Kosebalaban, Religion and Politics in Saudi Arabia: Wahhabism and the State, 60–61. 
This enduring alliance is remarkable because the monarchy and clergy are not equal 
partners in their arrangement in terms of power and superiority. The monarchy relies on 
the religious establishment to legitimize regime foreign policy decisions through favorable 
interpretations of Islamic law and the issuance of fatwas—official legal certifications in 
accordance with Islamic law.67 Additionally, the clergy further protects the Saudi regime 
during political crises by upholding one of Wahhabism’s main religious principles amongst 
its followers—ta’at wali al-amr—which requires full obedience to political rulers as a 
religious obligation and prohibits political opposition as long as the ruler preserves the 
practice of Islam and consults the clergy on internal domestic issues.68 However, the clergy 
remains subservient to the monarchy because the monarchy protects and allocates the 
clergy’s social and religious authority within Saudi Arabia.69 Since foreign policy falls 
outside of the clergy’s established sphere of domestic influence, the clergy is extremely 
limited in influencing foreign policy development, despite the regime’s requirement for the 
clergy to endorse Saudi’s foreign policy decisions.  
In application, the Saudi state coerces the Wahhabi religious establishment to 
silence domestic opposition, and endorse the state’s domestic and foreign policies through 
the clergy’s leverage of ta’at wali al-amr.70 These Wahhabi clerical endorsements buffer 
the monarchy from domestic opposition to controversial foreign policy decisions, such as 
Saudi’s enduring relationship with the United States and limited cooperation with Israel.71 
67 Faisal Mukhyat Abu Sulaib, “The Role of Religion in the Politics of Saudi Arabia: The Wahhabi 
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In exchange, the monarchy builds Wahhabi schools, sponsors international Wahhabi 
missionary work, and tolerates the clergy’s issuance of ultra-conservative social and 
religious fatwas that strengthen the clergy’s social and religious power over Saudi-
Wahhabi citizens and the Wahhabi diaspora.72 However, this stability is highly 
orchestrated by the monarchy itself. While the House of Saud depends on, respects and 
fosters the clergy’s religious and social authority, the monarchy is the stronger partner in 
this mutually beneficial relationship. There are contemporary examples of the monarchy 
coercing Wahhabi clerical compliance to meet the needs of the Saud regime, as was evident 
in 2010 when King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud issued a royal decree limiting the 
religious issuance of fatwas to the regime-sponsored Council of Senior Scholars, thereby 
bolstering the monarchy’s religious authority over the clergy in furtherance of its own 
traditional agenda.73 Conversely, there are no comparable contemporary examples of the 
Wahhabi clergy coercing the monarchy to comply to the Wahhabi religious agenda.  
2. Saudi Monarchy’s Traditional View of Israel, Support to Palestinians 
The imbalanced dynamic between the Saudi monarchy and Wahhabi clergy begs to 
ask how powerful the clergy actually is in steering Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy with 
Israel. Is the traditional monarchy’s stance against Israel grounded in Wahhabi doctrine, or 
is Saudi’s stance on Israel instead a result of the Saudi monarchy compelling the religious 
establishment to endorse traditional Arab policies against Israel? While it appears that 
Wahhabi principles are culpable for limiting Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Israel, the 
reality is more nuanced. Wahhabi clerics reinforce the regime’s stance on Israel through 
favorable Quranic interpretation and the issuance of fatwas.74 However, Wahhabi doctrine 
does not drive Saudi’s foreign policy towards Israel. Instead, the House of Saud’s historical 
Arabian bigotry against the Jewish people, combined with its growing political pragmatism 
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over time, has driven Saudi’s evolving foreign policy towards Israel.75 Ibn Saud held a 
demonized perception of the Jews before he reestablished the House of Saud’s alliance 
with the Al al-Shaikh, believing the Jews were cursed for persecuting Jesus and rejecting 
the Prophet Muhammad.76 However, Ibn Saud’s perception of the Jews was not supported 
by Wahhabism. Instead, ibn Abd al-Wahhab promoted a peaceful coexistence with the 
Jewish people in attempts to mirror Quranic teachings. The House of Saud garnered 
political power as overzealous crusaders for Wahhabism, and in doing so may have blended 
their cultural bigotry against the Jews with Islamic faith to inform Saudi’s foreign policy.77 
As part of maintaining that political power, the monarchy has leveraged the Islamic 
principle of  ta’at wali al-amr to guide Wahhabi clerical endorsement of Saudi’s changing 
foreign policy towards Israel over time.78 
The Wahhabi clergy could justify Saudi’s political opposition to Israel through the 
Salafi principle of Al Wala’ wal Bara’—loyalty (wala’) to Muslims conforming to 
Wahhabi practices, and disavowal (bara’) of all non-Muslims.79 However, the Wahhabi 
clergy does not have the political power to implement Al Wala’ wal Bara’ into Saudi 
Arabia’s foreign policy, and would need the monarchy to authorize such a stance towards 
Israel.80 Over time, Al Wala’ wal Bara’ has been interpreted by Salafi scholars in two 
fundamentally different ways. One interpretation calls for a spiritual jihad (struggle) 
against heresy and disbelief, whereas the second interpretation calls for a physical jihad 
against non-believers, to include the use of extreme violence against non-Muslims.81 The 
founder of Wahhabism, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, did promote the principle of Al Wala’ wal 
Bara’ and prohibited Wahhabi Muslims from befriending, allying themselves or imitating 
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non-Wahhabi Muslims.82 However, Ibn Abd al-Wahhab did not support physical hostility 
against the Jewish people, and instead advocated for cooperation and treaties with both 
Christians and Jews whenever possible due to their special status as fellow monotheists.83 
The contemporary Saudi state has implemented varying and often contradictory 
clerical interpretations of Al Wala’ wal Bara’ in application to Israel.84 The Wahhabi 
clergy remains subservient to the monarchy out of fear of the regime withdrawing the 
clergy’s social and religious authority, and has largely abandoned its political application 
of Al Wala’ wal Bara’ altogether.85 Wahhabi scholars uphold the social and religious 
application of Al Wala’ wal Bara’ inside of Saudi Arabia, but either ignore its political 
application to the state’s alliance with non-Muslim countries such as Israel, or issue fatwas 
in contradiction to Al Wala’ wal Bara as directed by the monarchy to legitimize the 
regime’s political decisions.86 There are some Wahhabi scholars who remain in opposition 
to the state’s alliance with non-Muslim countries under the political interpretation of Al 
Wala’ wal Bara’.87 However, the regime silences clerical dissent and coerces clerical 
compliance by allocating social and religious authority to regime-friendly Wahhabi 
clerics.88 If the Saudi monarchy ultimately guides Saudi’s foreign policy and compels 
Wahhabi clerical conformity to those policies, then Saudi’s anti-Israeli policies are 
predominantly the result of the regime conflating its traditional Arab perception of the Jews 
and political pragmatism with faith.89 The monarchy has leveraged the Wahhabi clergy to 
endorse, and therefore legitimize both anti-Semitic policies and tolerance towards the 
Jewish state, depending on the regime’s fluctuating political requirements.  
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Saudi Arabia’s stance against Israel and support to the Palestinians has changed 
over time as a result of the monarchy’s oscillation between reform initiatives and Wahhabi-
backed Arab tradition. Ibn Saud’s desire to demonstrate the compatibility between 
Wahhabi and Western ideologies, combined with his conflicting demonized perception of 
the Jewish people has shaped Saudi Arabia’s enduring relations with Israel.90 Ibn Saud 
delineated the protection of the Palestinians’ right to their homeland as “an existential 
Islamic [and] Arab responsibility” and core tenet of Saudi’s original foreign policy.91 Even 
before Israel’s establishment in 1948, Saudi Arabia communicated support to the 
Palestinians through harsh rhetoric and criticism of the Western-backed Zionist 
displacement and expulsion of Palestinian citizens from Palestine—the precursor state to 
Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.92 In 1945, when U.S. President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt asked Saudi King Ibn Saud for assistance in the creation of Israel as the Jewish 
homeland, Ibn Saud rejected the idea that the Jewish people should have their own country 
in the Middle East simply because they were persecuted and murdered by the German 
Nazis.93 Ibn Saud instead advocated for the Jews and their allies to “make [their German] 
enemy and oppressor pay,” since the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine required the 
Arabs—specifically the Palestinians—to pay for German crimes against the Jews.94 Saudi 
Arabia therefore remained opposed to the founding of Israel in 1948, financed Palestinian 
groups in their fight against Israel in 1967, and joined the 1973 Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries’ oil embargo to pressure Israel’s allies to withdrawal their 
support to Israel during the Yom Kippur War.95 The Saudi regime has politically opposed 
Israel through policies and boycotts—short of triggering military conflict—that balance its 
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traditional Arab policies against the Jewish people and religious responsibility to protect 
other Muslims, with its defense-driven relationships with the West.96 
3. Arab-Israeli Peace Initiatives 
The Saudi monarchy’s political stance towards the Jewish people involved 
pragmatic considerations beyond the legitimacy of the state of Israel alone. Before Israel’s 
establishment, the House of Saud mediated the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine to 
pacify its British ally and prevent Saudi’s rival, the Hashemite Dynasty, from gaining 
influence in Palestine and the Arab world writ large.97 While Saudi supported anti-Israeli 
initiatives in the region from 1945 onward, Saudi did not lead any of these initiatives, and 
avoided direct conflict in the Arab-Israeli wars between 1948 and 1967 altogether.98 
However, after the 1973 oil boom and Saudi Arabia’s nascent preeminence as a regional 
and international partner, Saudi began to spearhead a series of proactive policies to resolve 
the Arab-Israeli conflict.99 Saudi has also avoided direct conflict in the Arab-Israeli wars 
from 1973 to present, but has been actively involved in the Arab-Israeli peace process since 
the early 1980s.100  
Saudi’s involvement in the peace process has combined the public broadcast of 
detailed peace initiatives with covert diplomatic negotiations with Israel.101 Then-Saudi 
Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 1981 peace initiative and then-Crown Prince 
Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) both advocated for 
the following: Israel’s withdrawal from the territories it conquered (including East 
Jerusalem) during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Jewish settler evacuation from those 
territories, considerations for the Palestinian right of return to their homes in Israel, and the 
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re-establishment of a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem.102 The two Saudi peace 
initiatives subtly differed in their wording on the recognition of Israel as a state, as well as 
the Palestinian right of return to their homeland. Fahd’s plan “[implied] indirect recognition 
of Israel,” and the Palestinian right of return or the receipt of monetary compensation from 
Israel.103 However, as a result of Saudi wanting to improve its image to the West following 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States that involved 15 Saudi 
nationals, as well as Saudi’s desire to contain regional instability emanating from the 
Second Intifada in 2000, the API was far more accommodating to Israel.104 The plan 
advocated for full normalization between the Arab States and Israel in exchange for a 
Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and a more compromising “just solution” to 
displaced Palestinians’ right to return in accordance with the UN General Assembly 
guidance.105 The API continues to inform Saudi’s approach to Israel and the Palestinian 
issue, as Saudi tradition and political pragmatism compete to inform Saudi’s foreign policy 
towards Israel.  
B. CURRENT STATUS OF TENSIONS 
Saudi and Israel’s pragmatic relationship endures today under the current Saudi 
monarch, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. It ebbs and flows as a result of 
developments to the Palestinian issue, mutual security concerns, Saudi’s reform initiatives, 
and U.S. influence in the region. However, King Salman’s son and the future king of Saudi 
Arabia, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), notably diverges from the 
traditional Saudi monarchy’s stance against Israel and sense of responsibility to the 
Palestinian people. He is far more open to increasing Saudi’s cooperative relationship with 
Israel than his predecessors. MBS’ forefathers based their perceptions and foreign policy 
towards Israel within the context of the House of Saud’s traditional role as crusaders for 
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Islam, the Arab-Israeli wars and Palestinian intifadas.106 Conversely, MBS has shaped his 
perception of Israel as part of a hierarchy of contemporary existential threats to the 
Kingdom, of which Israel is not at the top of that rack and stack. MBS instead considers 
Iran, jihadist groups, and transnational Islamist movements as existential threats to the 
monarchy, not Israel.107 MBS recognizes Israel’s utility in combatting existential threats 
to the Kingdom and “[does not] have [the] visceral, emotional attachment to the Palestinian 
cause” that the previous generation of Saudi leaders held.108 However, despite the title of 
Crown Prince, MBS is not the king yet. He will not succeed his father as king without the 
royal family’s façade of approval, backed by the Wahhabi religious establishment. More 
importantly, even if he becomes king, his reign will not last without reconciling the ruling 
family’s enduring cultural bigotry towards the Jewish people, as well as maintaining the 
Wahhabi clerical endorsement that legitimizes the House of Saud’s political power.109 
1. Recent Events 
Any easing of tensions between Saudi Arabia and Israel on the Palestinian issue 
over the last two decades is further complicated by early 2021 escalatory events between 
Israel and Hamas—the Palestinian militant group that governs Gaza. In early May 2021, 
an 11-day conflict between Israel and Hamas ignited after Israeli forces attempted to 
execute an October 2020 Israeli court order to evict four Palestinian families from their 
homes in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah.110 Pro-Jewish settler 
organizations claimed the land was originally under Jewish ownership, while the 
Palestinians conversely viewed the evictions as part of an Israeli policy to displace 
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Palestinians from Jerusalem to preserve a Jewish majority in the city.111 The evictions 
coincided with the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, resulting in confrontations 
between Israeli forces and Palestinian protestors at the homes of those being evicted, and 
at the Al-Aqsa Mosque—Islam’s third holiest site. What started as Israeli riot control 
escalated into Israeli forces conducting a flash raid against the Al-Aqsa compound that 
wounded over 300 Palestinians. The incident then spiraled into Hamas firing 
approximately 200 rockets towards Israel (although Israeli forces claim over 1,500 rockets) 
and Israeli fighter jets bombing the Gaza strip, to include Palestinian armed group 
headquarters, a police building, and civilian apartments.112 The recent clashes mark the 
most intense escalation between Israel and Hamas in Gaza since Israel’s 2014 war on Gaza.  
This Al-Aqsa incident inflames historical anti-Israel sentiments amongst the Saudi 
monarchy and religious establishment alike. Despite international calls for de-escalation, 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that “both the might and frequency 
of the attacks will be increased” against Gaza.113 In opposition to Israel, Saudi Foreign 
Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s solidarity with the 
Palestinian people and commitment to a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with 
East Jerusalem as its capital. Faisal reiterated Riyadh’s enduring stance that stability in the 
Middle East is partly contingent on a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israel conflict, 
stating that “[Saudi Arabia’s] position is clear, which is to reach a permanent solution 
according to the Arab [Peace] Initiative.”114 
2. Saudi Arabia’s Enduring Requirement for Palestinian Self-
Determination 
Israel’s delivery of what Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan calls “a 
Palestinian state within the 1967 border that gives Palestinians dignity and their rights” 
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endures as Saudi’s central impediment to full normalization of relations with Israel.115 
Saudi’s 2002 Arab Peace Initiative made a significant step in recognizing Israel’s security 
concerns emanating from the Palestinian population. Additionally, Saudi has eased its 
economic restrictions against Israel, and the two countries continue to cooperate in 
technology, medical, intelligence, and military arenas, despite the vague and highly 
classified nature of their cooperation.116 However, despite these improvements, Saudi’s 
requirement for Palestinian self-determination as a prerequisite to normalization with Israel 
remains impassable.117 The House of Saud will continue to leverage the intertwining 
values of Arab tradition, political pragmatism and Wahhabism—including the monarchy’s 
traditional self-imposed responsibility to the Palestinian people—to safeguard the regime 
from domestic opposition that could topple the monarchy.118 Therefore, Saudi’s malleable 
Arab-Israeli peace initiatives and fluctuating cooperation with Israel will continue to 
balance Saudi’s dynamic considerations of self-defense, Arab tradition and its relationship 
with the United States. The Arab-Israeli issue keeps Saudi Arabia and Israel in adversarial 
tension, and requires the Saudi monarchy to make foreign policy decisions on Israel that 
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III. DRIVERS OF SAUDI ARABIA’S COOPERATION WITH 
ISRAEL 
The main drivers of Saudi cooperation with Israel—mutual concern over Iran, 
Saudi’s secular reforms under Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and 
U.S. influence—are highly nuanced when examined separately, and complex at best when 
examined collectively. While these drivers have significant potential to motivate Saudi 
Arabia to forge cooperative ties short of normalization of relations with Israel, they could 
also whither in effectiveness in the event that Iran ceases to be a security threat to the 
Kingdom, MBS reverses reform initiatives, or U.S. influence matters less in the region. 
This chapter examines each individual driver and its specific impact on Saudi Arabia’s 
desire to cooperate with Israel—to include a historical background of each driver, and 
analysis of how the driver promotes Saudi cooperation with Israel. These drivers are 
presented from the Saudi perspective. Ultimately, this chapter argues that all three of these 
drivers have the potential to promote short-term strategic incentives for Saudi Arabia and 
Israel to cooperate on limited and mutually beneficial regional activities.  
A. MUTUAL CONCERN OVER IRAN 
Of the three drivers this case study examines, the threat of Iran is currently the most 
palpable driver of Saudi Arabia’s cooperation initiatives with Israel. Saudi Arabia and 
Israel both view Iran as their greatest security threat.119 Iran’s exportation of revolutionary 
Islam, mobilization of client militias, and nuclear program pose both internal and external 
threats to the Saudi regime. This has motivated Saudi Arabia to establish a pragmatic and 
strategic relationship with Israel to counter and deter Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions. 
These growing threats from Iran have encouraged the Saudi Kingdom to exchange 
historical animosity towards the Jewish state for strategic deterrence in the form of limited 
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military and intelligence cooperation against Iran—an arrangement that is likely to 
continue as long as a mutually perceived threat from Iran exists.120 
1. History of the Iranian Threat to Saudi Arabia 
Often referred to as the Middle Eastern Cold War, Saudi Arabia and Iran are 
engaged in a decades-old power feud, exacerbated by ideological differences and foreign 
influence.121 In a 2018 interview, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman accused the 
Iranian regime of “spread[ing] their extremist [Shiite] ideology….an ideology of pure 
evil,” and called Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the “Hitler of the 
Middle East” that is “trying to conquer the world.”122 Iran’s entire existence is a posture 
against foreign aggression, specifically against the United States, Israel, and their network 
of partners and allies. Saudi Arabia’s cooperation with the United States and Israel in 
coordination of political and military efforts against Iran—even inconsistently—further 
compounds Iran’s revolutionary ideology. Iran operationalizes its ideology by exporting 
its revolutionary model, leveraging a proxy network of regional allies, and pursuing a 
nuclear enrichment program. Iran’s 1979 Revolution—more specifically Iran’s exportation 
of its revolutionary model beyond its borders, as well as Iran’s proxy groups and nuclear 
enrichment program—have culminated into a monumental and enduring physical and 
ideological threat to the Saudi regime that continues to shape Saudi’s domestic and foreign 
policies, and informs its military alliances.  
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a. Iran’s Revolutionary Ideology 
Iran’s revolutionary ideology threatens Saudi Arabia’s political power and ruling 
authority derived from its role as a protector of Islam.123 The 1979 Iranian Revolution 
permeates every aspect of Iran’s existence. Iran establishes its domestic and foreign 
policies to address threats to its main security goals—safeguarding Iran’s juristic 
guardianship and revolutionary ideology, and expelling the United States and Israel from 
the region. The regime’s enduring commitment to its ideology, its narrative of victimhood, 
and its desire for regional leadership overlap and reinforce one another to influence Iran’s 
behavior in the Middle East in pursuit of its main security goals. Iran’s revolutionary 
ideology is antithetical to Saudi’s foreign policy goals of safeguarding the Saudi regime, 
promoting Wahhabism at home and abroad, and preserving its longstanding relationship 
with the United States.124 
Above all else, Iran’s primary security goal is the defense of its theocratic regime 
and revolutionary ideology—both of which challenge Saudi’s political and religious 
influence in the Middle East. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei guides the regime, and 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and subordinate Basij paramilitary force 
defend the regime.125 Khamenei’s absolute authority is outlined in Iran’s 1979 
Constitution under the principle of vali-ye faqih—delineating guardian jurist rule over the 
Islamic Republic.126 Safeguarding this juristic guardianship is critical to the Islamic 
Republic’s existence. Without a loyal and cohesive support base to uphold the juristic 
guardianship, there would be no Islamic Republic.127 The Supreme Leader has ultimate 
religio-political authority that trickles down into all domestic and foreign policies. This 
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dynamic insulates the regime from being overthrown by controlling the distribution of 
political power and ultimately creates a façade of institutional consensus.128 Iran’s foreign 
policy towards Saudi Arabia is therefore a reflection of its original anti-imperialist 1979 
revolutionary ideology that Iran’s Supreme Leaders have safeguarded over time. Whereas 
Saudi Arabia has established strong political and economic ties to other regional actors and 
the Western world over time, Iran has remained mostly isolated and forged a foreign policy 
that categorizes Saudi as an enemy co-conspirator with the West—and therefore an 
illegitimate Muslim power.129  
Furthermore, Iran has framed Saudi as a U.S.-backed aggressor that challenges 
Iran’s stability and regional ambitions by actively opposing its revolutionary ideology.130 
Iran’s narrative of victimization by what Foreign Minister Zarif describes as the United 
States and its “anti-Iran co-conspirators,” has driven regime security and revolutionary 
ideology by emphasizing persistent external threats to Iran.131 Conflict is integral to Iran 
justifying its juristic guardianship and maintaining its revolutionary momentum.132 
Because the 1979 Revolution sprang from a narrative of victimhood, Iran has asserted its 
dignity and independence from U.S. intervention and foreign influence writ large after two 
decades of perceived oppression by Iran’s U.S.-backed monarchy.133 This sentiment 
endures, as was evident in Ayatollah Khamenei’s early May 2021 public statement that 
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“the Islamic Revolution removed Iran from being under control of the [United States].”134 
The regime has constructed a permanent narrative that the juristic guardianship defends 
Iran’s strength and dignity against imperialist aggression. The enduring presence of the 
United States and its partners (such as Saudi Arabia) in the region, as well as crippling U.S. 
economic sanctions against Iran, allow the Iranian regime to perpetuate this victimhood 
narrative that Iran is battling for the soul of the Middle East. This revolutionary momentum 
of victimhood perpetuates part of Iran’s existential conflict with Saudi Arabia because of 
Saudi’s enduring ties with the United States.  
Following Iran’s primary security goal of safeguarding the regime and its 
revolutionary ideology is its commitment to expelling the United States and Israel, both 
physically and in influence, from the Middle East.135 To Iran, the enduring U.S. military 
footprint in the region and its impact on regional partners, as well as Israel’s occupation of 
Palestinian lands continue the system of domination that inspired Iran’s 1979 
Revolution.136 Per its constitution, Iran can justify its legal obligation to expel the United 
States and Israel from the region on the basis of foreign occupation that destabilizes the 
region and spreads un-Islamic values to other countries like Saudi Arabia. The physical 
expulsion of U.S. and Israeli forces, as well as the degradation of their influence in the 
region bolsters Iran’s security by eliminating foreign military threats and increasing Iran’s 
military power through its own expanding network of allies.137  
b. Iran’s Exportation of Revolutionary Islam 
Immediately following the 1979 Islamic Revolution and Iran’s establishment of its 
theocratic regime, Saudi Arabia was concerned that Iran’s intention to export the revolution 
to neighboring countries would spill over into Saudi Arabia and throughout the Gulf 
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States.138 Saudi’s concerns compounded over the years as its diplomatic relations with Iran 
deteriorated, and Saudi instead developed a strategic partnership with the United States 
while Iran sought to undermine that partnership.139 Iran’s 1979 Revolution galvanized an 
enduring legacy of Iranian Supreme leaders advancing foreign policy based on Iran as the 
self-appointed leader of all Shia Muslims—specifically those in the Middle East—in their 
fight against imperialism, to include countries like Saudi Arabia that perpetuate 
imperialism.140 Iran is devoted to the protection and empowerment of the region’s Shia 
Muslims and its interpreted constitutional mandate to export its Revolution with all of the 
resources it has available.141 Saudi Arabia’s minority Shia populations and the Saudi-
backed Palestinians are direct recipients of Iran’s exported revolutionary ideology that 
threatens to undermine Saudi’s influence at home and abroad.  
Iran’s anti-monarchical, pan-Islamic revolutionary ideology places  Iran in direct 
religious and ideological competition with Saudi Arabia.142 Exporting the revolution is 
both an internal and external security policy. Externally, Iran is standing in solidarity with 
similarly oppressed people (including Sunnis) and nations as a leader against the 
imperialist enemies of Islam.143 However, exporting the revolution outside of Iran’s 
borders provides an additional mechanism to internally secure its juristic guardianship. By 
leading Muslim allies abroad, Iran projects its own anti-imperialist and pro-Islamic goals 
that underpin its revolutionary ideology, and establishes foreign allies that are invested in 
Iranian regime survival.144 The result is a regional hegemonic rivalry between Saudi 
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Arabia and Iran, and a shared perception that one country gains influence at the expense of 
the other.145  
The destabilizing posture of Iran’s exportation of its revolution as a progressive 
model of liberation challenges Saudi Arabia’s monarchical and religious establishment, 
and amplifies existing social and political grievances within disaffected Sunni and Shia 
communities in Saudi Arabia.146 Following its 1979 Revolution and transition to theocratic 
governance, the Iranian Shia clerical establishment openly challenged the Saudi monarchy 
and Wahhabi clerical establishment, claiming that the empowerment of all Muslims was 
incompatible with Gulf monarchies and proselytizing ideas of Gulf citizens demanding 
rights and opposing authoritarian rule.147 Iran’s ideological attacks against the Saudi 
regime, as well as Iran’s exportation of its revolutionary model to disenfranchised 
populations within Saudi Arabia threatens Saudi’s existence by undermining its political 
legitimacy.148 Iran operationalizes these attacks through the use of proxy forces. 
c. Iran’s Proxy Groups 
Since the early 2000s, Iran’s mobilization of Shia and non-Shia militia groups has 
posed both internal revolutionary political threats and external military threats to the Saudi 
regime. Iran has used proxy forces to undermine Saudi’s political authority, and punish 
Saudi Arabia for contributing to the lasting Western influence in the Middle East.149 
Iranian client militias have threatened Saudi’s domestic political security by instigating 
domestic unrest within the Kingdom and neighboring Saudi-backed Bahrain.150 They have 
also threatened Saudi’s physical security by training and equipping small cells in Saudi and 
Bahrain, as well as client militias in Lebanon and Yemen to attack Saudi Arabia.151 
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Additionally, Iran has monopolized on the turbulent relationship between Saudi Arabia and 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip by funding Hamas as Saudi distanced itself from Hamas over time 
while maintaining its support to the Palestinians.152 Iran has used proxy forces as an 
extension of its military reach and power, and developed a transnational clientage of allied 
militants—based on a blend of political, ideological and material incentives—to 
offensively project the regime’s influence by spreading its revolutionary ideology and 
defending its territorial interests.153 Saudi Arabia, as well as other Sunni Gulf States have 
faced a diverse array of ideological, regional and security challenges emanating from Iran’s 
shadowy alliances with foreign civilian and military entities.  
Iran views these partnerships partly as a means to increase its religio-political 
authority at the expense of Saudi’s political and religious establishments, but more broadly 
as an “Axis of Resistance” to Western domination, Israel, and Western-compliant Arab 
governments.154 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) stresses that Iran’s 
development, maintenance and control over of its third party relationships vary from each 
operational theatre based on mutual objectives.155 IISS further explains that the traditional 
definition of the term ‘proxy’ does not apply across the board for Iran’s varying regional 
partnerships since ‘proxy’ implies Iran’s directive and uniform level of control over weaker 
non-state actors. Iran’s foreign partnerships instead have varying command and control 
structures and are not part of a formalized network. These varying third party relationships 
are ideologically, politically and logistically distinct, and can either emerge as part of 
natural enduring partnership, or a shorter partnership of opportunity. Iran’s strategic proxy 
force capability fluctuates in tandem with evolving conflict, Iran’s ability to mobilize these 
groups as part of a global Shia community, and the potential strategic advantage it obtains 
by doing so.156 Although not all-encompassing of the elements of Iran’s Axis of Resistance 
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that impact Saudi Arabia, the following primary examples of Iranian-backed third parties 
demonstrate the Axis’ external threat to Saudi Arabia’s regional security: Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and the Houthis in Yemen.  
(1) Lebanese Hezbollah 
Iran’s strongest client, Lebanese Hezbollah, has conducted and supported Iranian-
directed attacks via the Yemeni Houthis against Saudi infrastructure, as well as recruited 
and trained Saudi Arabian Shia citizens as part of Iran’s revolution-exporting agenda.157 
Lebanese Hezbollah, Hezbollah is part of a small collection of the Iranian clientage that 
subscribes to vali-ye faqih—delineating the Supreme Leader’s authority over the Islamic 
Republic and broader Middle East.158 The IISS convey that Hezbollah, which established 
a relationship with Iran in the 1980s as a result of the Lebanese Civil War and Iran’s Islamic 
Revolution, is best described as an ideological partner of Iran since its unique proxy 
relationship with Iran transcends material incentives.159 Hezbollah remains resilient 
against non-religious influences and would pursue the same ideological objectives as Iran 
without Iran’s sponsorship, albeit with more humble resources.160 As a result of over four 
decades of Iranian mentorship, Hezbollah has become the most instrumental non-state 
actor in furthering Iran’s regional goals and activities. Enduring regional sectarian tensions 
and Saudi’s fight against the Houthis—another Iran-backed foreign force—in Yemen 
position Hezbollah to directly target Saudi infrastructure, as well as train other Iran-backed 
third parties to target Saudi through asymmetric and plausibly deniable attacks.161  
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Since at least 2014, Iran has supported the Houthi movement against the Yemeni 
government and Western forces and partners—to include Saudi Arabia—in the region. Iran 
leverages the Houthis’ deep resentment towards Saudi Arabia and the West to galvanize 
attacks against Saudi and western infrastructure in the Gulf, and provides the Houthis with 
funding, training and equipment.162 IISS reports that the Houthis are best described as a 
strategic ally of Iran, since they share mutual opposition against the West and Saudi Arabia; 
however, similarly to Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis would continue to pursue their 
opposition without Iranian sponsorship albeit with more humble resources.163 Their 
research elaborates that despite a mutual overarching Shia religious commonality, the 
Houthis are Zaydi Shia and do not subscribe to the Iranian Twelver doctrine or follow the 
Supreme Leader as their singular religio-political authority. Instead, Iran’s strong 
relationship with the Houthis likely emanates from its exclusive patronage of the Houthis, 
thereby allowing Iran to spread its influence in Yemen and wage war against regional 
rivals, to include Saudi Arabia. IISS notes that the Houthi’s unexpected takeover of Sanaa, 
Yemen in 2014 provided Iran with an opportunity to inexpensively inflict damage against 
Saudi Arabia. By 2017, the Houthis used Iranian explosive boats to attack Saudi vessels in 
the Red Sea and Iranian-funded and technologically developed extended range missiles to 
target Riyadh directly, which Saudi Arabia viewed as an act of war.164 Iran is committed 
to the survival of the Houthis and their ability to project power throughout the region on 
Iran’s behalf, especially against Saudi Arabia.165  
(3) Hamas 
Lastly, Iran has degraded Saudi Arabia’s political relationship with Hamas—a 
Sunni Palestinian Islamist nationalist insurgent group and affiliate of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood—by deepening its own relationship with Hamas since the early 2000s.166 The 
IISS categorizes—as a partner of Iran with roots tracing back to the 1990s, since without 
Iran’s transactional sponsorship Hamas likely would not pursue the same objectives.167 
The IISS further notes that as a Sunni component of Iran’s Axis of Revolution, Hamas 
underscores Iran’s ability to shelve sectarian differences in the advancement of its 
geopolitical aspirations. Lacking an organic relationship with Iran, Hamas rejects Tehran’s 
religious authority, is wary of bolstering Persian power in Arab lands, and maintains a 
complex relationship with Israel.168 However, Iran and Hezbollah have become Hamas’ 
primary sponsors. IISS further elaborates that Iran views Hamas as a counterweight against 
Israel and the West, political cover for Iran’s outreach in the Arab world, and a potential 
ally in the event of a multi-front war against Israel, the West and its Arab partners like 
Saudi Arabia.  
Despite Saudi Arabia’s historical funding of and support of Hamas’ activities 
against Israel, Saudi Arabia now views the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a 
mechanism for Iran to exploit and further exacerbate Arab division and expand its regional 
influence.169 Hezbollah and Iran do not have full command and control over Hamas and 
their relationship has ebbed and flowed, as evident with Hamas’ sympathies for the 
opposition that Iran aided the Syrian regime in fighting during the 2011 Syrian revolution. 
However, Hezbollah and Iran—who both supported the Syrian regime—minimally 
punished Hamas by decreasing their funding and support, while allowing for future 
rapprochement.170 Saudi continues to publicly support the Palestinian right to self-
determination, and remains critical of Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. However, Saudi 
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Arabia has largely disassociated itself from Hamas and even imprisoned Hamas leaders 
and supporters due to Hamas’ suspected terrorist activities and affiliation with Iran.171  
(4) Proxy Group Activity Against Saudi Arabia 
Viewing the expulsion of United States and Western forces from the region as a 
means of increasing its regional dominance, Iran has supported militant groups within 
Saudi Arabia to pressure the Saudi government to abandon its Western alliances and extract 
a cost for Saudi’s prolonged political partnership with the United States.172 Iran’s 
revolutionary message has garnered proxy support from both Shia and non-Shia Saudi 
citizens. Specific to Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom’s religious sectarian policies have 
alienated Saudi Shia populations, and Iran is the only foreign country to vocally recognize 
and support the Saudi Shia plight.173 Consequently, Iran’s religiously inspired anti-Saudi 
rhetoric has resonated with disaffected fellow Shia communities in Saudi Arabia, and 
possibly amplified pre-existing social and political grievances against the Saudi regime.174 
The IISS provides the example of the 1979–1980 Intifada of the Eastern Province in Saudi 
Arabia—a violent uprising in protest of Shia social and economic exclusion within Saudi 
Arabia—as the direct result of Iranian inspiration and support to the disaffected Shia 
population within Saudi Arabia.175 The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point claims 
that Saudi Arabia has contemporarily viewed its minority Shia population as a potentially 
disloyal vehicle for Iranian expansion.176 In 2017 Saudi Arabia uncovered a five man cell 
of Saudi Arabian Shia militants, trained in Iran by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps 
(IRGC) on the use of rocket propelled grenades and explosives. The Saudi cell was part of 
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an Iranian effort to revive Hezbollah al-Hejaz, an Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah-
affiliated group responsible for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Khobar, Saudi Arabia 
that killed 19 U.S. service members.177 Saudi has responded to its association of its Shia 
community with its broader rivalry with Iran through violent and repressive domestic 
crackdowns, as was evident in the 2016 execution of 47 dissident Shiites, to include the 
most senior Shia cleric and outspoken dissident in Saudi’s Eastern Province, Nimr al-
Nimr.178  
Furthermore, in 2011 Iran inflicted retaliatory proxy attacks against Saudi Arabia 
in response to a Saudi-backed Bahraini government crackdown against Shia protesters 
during the Arab Spring. Shock and anger amongst the Iranian regime, Bahraini Shia, and 
Shia leadership in Iraq culminated in Iran sending covert IRGC operatives to Bahrain to 
meet with Bahraini protesters, as well as Iranian-backed assassination planning against the 
Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States.179 Iran’s main objective in establishing 
closer relations with Bahraini Shia was to inflict a retaliatory response against Saudi Arabia 
and prepare the Bahraini Shia resistance for further uprisings by training, operationalizing, 
and resourcing improvised explosive device cells inside Bahrain.180 Following the 
Bahraini government’s retaliation against Arab Spring protesters, a small group of Bahraini 
Shia youth travelled abroad and received training by Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah in camps 
in Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and Syria. This Iranian-sponsored training created a tempered and 
adaptive Iranian-backed Shia organization in Bahrain that internally threatens both the 
government of Bahrain and its neighboring Saudi patron.181 Instead of using a larger and 
overt military force against Saudi Arabia that could prompt a U.S. intervention, Iran 
exploits Saudi’s domestic vulnerabilities and leverages internal social and religious 
cleavages to mobilize disenfranchised populations against the Kingdom.  
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d. Iran’s Nuclear Program 
Iran’s embryonic nuclear enrichment program has posed a growing, and possibly 
existential threat to the Saudi regime since the International Atomic Energy Agency 
discovered Iran’s clandestine uranium enrichment program in the early 2000s.182 Iran 
pursues nuclear enrichment as a bulwark against foreign aggression and insists on 
maintaining its own nuclear fuel development due to lack of trust with the international 
community, perceived victimization under international sanctions, and decades of foreign 
intervention in the Middle East.183 Under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA), Iran significantly rolled back its nuclear program—to include limiting its 
enrichment activities, number of reactors, and uranium stockpiles—in exchange for 
economic sanctions relief.184 The unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement 
under the Trump administration, despite Iran’s fulfillment of its obligations, shortly 
preceded ramped up U.S. economic sanctions against Iran.185 The Trump administration 
cited the shortness of the agreement, as well as weak restrictions against Iran’s ballistic 
missile arsenal as justification for breaking the deal.186 In response, Iran reinvigorated its 
nuclear program. Iran has stated that its nuclear program is intended for peaceful purposes 
and condemned the United States for not honoring its obligations under JCPOA.187 
However, Saudi is concerned that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon due to its pursuit of 
uranium enrichment levels beyond the scope of peaceful civilian research.188 Israel shares 
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Saudi’s concerns over an Iranian nuclear program and the two countries have conspired to 
derail Iran’s nuclear program.189   
Iran’s nuclear program has ramifications for Saudi Arabia and beyond the face 
value of Iran pursuing nuclear enrichment. Saudi Arabia believes that the health of Iran’s 
nuclear program impacts Iran’s ability to invest in its other military programs since Iran 
has to judiciously allocate its scarce economic resources, especially under crippling 
economic sanctions.190 Consequently, Saudi Arabia objected to the 2015 JCPOA nuclear 
deal which allowed Iran to fund its nuclear program through international donations, 
thereby conserving its own resources to sustain regional proxy militia forces that attack 
Saudi interests.191 However, lifting economic sanctions against the Iranian regime may not 
directly correlate to increased Iranian proxy force activity.192 Iran provides varying levels 
of financial, technological and training support to militant groups across the region that 
share mutual interests with Iran, but most of these groups would pursue these interests 
without Iranian sponsorship, albeit with more humble resources.193 Additionally, Iranian 
proxy activity against Saudi Arabia increased following the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from 
JCPOA, and Iran signed a $400 billion dollar investment deal with China in March 2021 
to sidestep the impact of economic sanctions on the regime’s financial resources.194 Proxy 
force activity undoubtedly could be deadlier if Iran had additional resources to purchase 
more advanced weapons systems for its proxy groups. However, the uptick in proxy force 
activity appears more closely related to an uptick in Iran’s discontent with the United 
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States, Saudi Arabia and Israel’s foreign policies towards and cooperation against Iran. 
Regardless, Saudi Arabia seeks a stronger international nuclear agreement that limits Iran’s 
nuclear ambitions, as well as Iran’s missile programs and proxy force activities.195  
Saudi Arabia is extremely concerned with Iran’s progress towards developing a 
nuclear weapon. In July 2021 the International Atomic Energy Association and United 
Nations watchdog confirmed that Iran was enriching uranium up to 60 percent.196 While 
nuclear weapons-grade uranium requires 90 percent enrichment, Iran’s nuclear enrichment 
activities have far surpassed the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)’s limit 
to 3.67 percent enrichment, as well as the 20 percent enrichment associated with civilian 
nuclear research reactor use.197 In light of the breakdown of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA), and Iran’s subsequent decision to reenergize it nuclear 
enrichment program outside of peaceful purposes, Saudi Arabia has considered developing 
its own nuclear weapons program as a deterrent against Iran.198 Israel does not support 
Saudi’s interest in pursuing a nuclear weapons program, but in the interim is equally 
dedicated to neutralizing Iran’s nuclear enrichment program before Iran acquires a nuclear 
weapon.199 
B. SAUDI ARABIA’S REFORM INITIATIVES UNDER MBS 
Compared to the two other main drivers of Saudi’s cooperation with Israel—mutual 
concern over Iran and U.S. influence in the Middle East—reform under Saudi Crown 
Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) is the most perplexing causal mechanism because 
it provides profound promise for enduring cooperation with Israel based on liberal theory, 
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but may be illusory based on the Saudi regime’s history. In his Vision 2030 plan, MBS has 
outlined a series of progressive initiatives to overhaul Saudi’s economy, stimulate 
international trade and foreign investment, enhance government transparency and 
accountability, and project tolerance and respect of all people.200 Theoretically, this driver 
has immense potential to forge enduring ties with Israel under a neoliberal institutionalist 
framework. However, in execution reform initiatives are a fine balance between the Saudi 
monarchy’s fluctuating desire for progress and its traditional fixation on eradicating 
domestic threats to the regime’s political authority.201  
1. Economic Opportunities  
Out of all of the Middle Eastern countries, Israel is the most capable of contributing 
to Saudi’s economic diversification.202 In his Vision 2030 plan, MBS seeks to transform 
the health, technology and financial sectors, tackle water scarcity, diversify revenue and 
decrease oil dependence, extract Saudi’s natural mineral resources, and develop human 
capital.203 Additionally, MBS and former Saudi politician and diplomat, Prince Turki bin 
Faisal, have publicly expressed the monarchy’s interest in partnering with Israel’s 
technological industry. Saudi’s water purification and desertification prevention initiatives 
would also robustly benefit from Israel’s agricultural expertise.204 With the second largest 
economy in the Middle East behind the United Arab Emirates and an international 
reputation for its technologically advanced medical, water engineering, agriculture, and 
mining sectors, Israel is “extraordinarily qualified” to assist Saudi Arabia in realizing the 
economic facet of Vision 2030.205  
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2. Rejection of Extremist Ideology and Promotion of Religious Tolerance 
MBS’s initiatives to confront extremist ideology and advocate for religious 
tolerance push MBS towards Israel as a potential ally because the two countries largely 
encounter the same ideological threats.206 MBS has accelerated Saudi Arabia’s 
counterterrorism threats. While MBS’ predecessor, Mohammed bin Nayef (MBN), 
dismantled Al Qaeda’s network within Saudi Arabia and openly supported a range of 
nonstate actors to counter Sunni extremists and Iranian-sponsored proxy groups in Syria, 
Iraq, and Yemen.207 However, MBN leveraged a more nuanced counterterrorism 
campaign, and used a gentle carrot-and-stick approach to neutralizing homegrown 
terrorism that focused on reforming and reintegrating Saudi extremists back into 
society.208 Conversely, in 2015 MBS announced a grandiose plan to establish an Islamic 
military coalition against terrorism based out of Riyadh, and initiated a jarring crackdown 
against domestic terrorism in 2017.209 It is unclear if MBS’s relentless counterterrorism 
initiatives are born out of a sincere sense of duty to eradicate extremism from Saudi Arabia. 
Alternatively, MBS’s counterterrorism zeal could have been a power move to make a name 
for himself in the international community, or an opportunity to implement domestic 
counterterrorism laws to methodically silence domestic criticism by legally incarcerating 
and executing peaceful citizen protesters.210 Regardless, Saudi Arabia and Israel are 
confronting many of the same religiously motivated threats (the Palestinians being an 
outlier) emanating from Iran and Sunni extremist groups. If MBS is sincerely determined 
as he said to “coordinate and support the efforts to fight terrorism in all regions and parts 
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of the Islamic world,” it would be pragmatic and logical for him to consider that “the enemy 
of my [terrorist] enemy is my friend” in terms of Israel.211  
Additionally, MBS’s religious tolerance initiatives lower Saudi’s traditional 
barriers to cooperating with Saudi Arabia. MBS’s Vision 2030 Religion and Tolerance 
Report reiterates that Saudi aspires to be a “country of moderate Islam that is open to all 
religions and to the rest of the world.”212 The report cites evidence of progress towards 
Semitic tolerance in Saudi’s removal of anti-Semitic material from textbooks, as well as a 
January 2019 Saudi initiative to commemorate International Holocaust Memorial Day.213 
In contrast to his predecessors, MBS grew up in a highly globalized and information-based 
society, and witnessed the international community brand Saudi Arabia as an extremist 
incubator following 9/11.214 As a result, MBS wants to shed Saudi Arabia’s hyper-
conservative reputation.215 Whereas his predecessors initiated policies to address 
extremism and promote a more moderate Saudi state following 9/11, they continued to 
prioritize the exportation of Wahhabism and Saudi’s responsibility to defend co-
religionists.216 Conversely, MBS has enlisted the religious establishment to legitimize 
religious tolerance as part of a return to Saudi’s “authentic roots,” which the monarchy 
claims were pluralistic, tolerant, and socially liberal.217  
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3. Fatigue with the Palestinian Cause 
MBS’ lack of sympathy for the Palestinian cause lowers Saudi political barriers for 
cooperating with Israel by diluting Saudi’s traditional sense of responsibility to the 
Palestinians. Rob Malley, a senior White House official in the Obama administration who 
met with MBS on several occasions, remarked that “MBS comes from a generation of Saudi 
leaders that doesn’t have a visceral, emotional attachment to the Palestinian cause.”218 
Malley further commented that MBS considered the Palestinian issue of self-determination 
“an annoying irritant—a problem to be overcome rather than a conflict to be fairly 
solved.”219 However, MBS is cognizant of the ramifications of pursuing a normalization 
agreement with Israel, stating that such an agreement would result in him being “killed by 
Iran, Qatar, and [his] own people.”220 Additionally, the recent Al-Aqsa Mosque clashes 
between Israeli forces and Palestinian protesters have unquestionably inflamed traditional 
anti-Semitic sentiments amongst the Saudi monarchy, religious establishment and Saudi 
citizens alike, reinforcing the fundamental and unchanged tenet of Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
policy toward Israel, at least temporarily.221 Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia is distancing itself 
from the Palestinians based on Hamas’ ties to terrorism and Iran, which if exacerbated over 
time could result in Saudi reneging on its traditional obligations to the Palestinians in Israel’s 
favor.222  
C. U.S. INFLUENCE (OR LACK THEREOF) 
Lastly, of all three main drivers, U.S. influence in the Middle East has the broadest 
and quickest potential to impact Saudi’s cooperative arrangement with Israel due to U.S. 
retrenchment from the region and its disaffection with the Saudi monarchy. The United States 
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provided the initial impetus for Saudi and Israel to view the pragmatic benefits of 
coordinating their activities in the region, and nurtured diplomatic ties between the two states 
over the last several decades.223 Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Israel base their regional 
security strategies on the U.S. willingness and ability to project strategic leadership across 
the region, and more importantly when the United States is unwilling or unable to do so.224 
Shared disdain over the Obama administration’s handling of Iran, abandonment of Hosni 
Mubarak in Egypt during the Arab Spring, and overall U.S. retrenchment from the region in 
light of two ongoing wars in the Middle East in Iraq and Afghanistan caused Saudi Arabia 
and Israel to question the reliability of the United States as a long-standing patron, and drew 
the Kingdom and Jewish state towards cooperating together.225  
While the Trump administration improved relations with Saudi Arabia between 
2016–2020 and further fostered ties between Saudi and Israel, it is unclear how a new Biden 
administration will alter this dynamic in the long term, or if relations between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia will improve with the next administration. However, it is clear that 
Saudi Arabia cannot depend on the United States in the near term, or as a long term reliable 
partner.226 While Saudi has benefited from decades of U.S. political and military backing, 
President Joe Biden seeks to shrink the U.S. presence in the Middle East, withdraw U.S. 
support to Saudi’s war in Yemen and negotiate with Iran on its nuclear program—a distinct 
and alarming change to the previous U.S. administration policy on Saudi.227 Even if the next 
administration mends any potential bad blood between the United States and Saudi from the 
Biden administration, an unpredictable and vacillating relationship with the United States is 
not compatible with Saudi’s regional security objectives. 
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IV. SCENARIOS THAT PROMOTE OR INHIBIT SAUDI 
ARABIA’S COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL 
The previous chapter explained how the main drivers of Saudi cooperation with 
Israel—mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s secular reforms under Saudi Crown Prince 
Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and U.S. influence—have encouraged Saudi Arabia’s 
cooperation initiatives with Israel over the last two decades. This chapter explores 
scenarios that could promote a closer cooperative relationship between the two states, as 
well as scenarios that could inhibit and/or deteriorate their cooperative arrangement. To 
gain a more holistic understanding of this highly dynamic problem set, this chapter 
concludes by exploring from a macro perspective how a change in one category of drivers 
of cooperation impacts the other two categories of drivers. Ultimately, this chapter argues 
that these drivers form an interactive system of influence that push and pull on Saudi 
Arabia’s highly dynamic cooperative arrangement with Israel, and that none of these 
drivers are constant. 
A. CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE SAUDI ARABIA’S COOPERATION 
WITH ISRAEL 
Saudi Arabia’s military and diplomatic cooperation with Israel against Iran, albeit 
discreet, is furthered by neorealist Kenneth Waltz’ idea of power balancing—“allying in 
opposition to the principal source of danger.”228 For Saudi Arabia, Iran is one of the largest 
military and ideological threats to the Kingdom and the Middle East writ large, and Israel 
is a regional power that shares that same perspective. An increase in their mutual perception 
of an Iranian threat has the potential to galvanize their cooperation initiatives to counter 
Iran’s power. Additionally, the Crown Prince’s Vision 2030 plan offers pragmatic 
economic opportunities for the Kingdom to strengthen ties with Israel, but more 
importantly advocates for increased religious tolerance and an aversion to extremist 
ideology that could lower Saudi’s domestic traditional barriers for cooperating with Israel. 
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These opportunities could evolve into a meaningful and enduring cooperative relationship. 
Lastly, Saudi’s relationship with the Unites States as an partner, mentor, weapons dealer 
and security guarantor is waning under the current U.S. administration. As the United 
States distances itself from its Saudi client, Saudi will have to adjust by increasing its 
political and military standing in the region, perhaps by establishing a stronger partnership 
with Israel—whose pragmatic values best align with Saudi’s political aspirations. It is 
unclear how many of these variables need to be actualized or in what order they need to be 
actualized to achieve normalized relations between the two countries. However, progress 
in any of these variables will improve cooperative ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, 
short of normalization. 
1. Iran Increases Its Regional Influence  
Saudi fears of a Shia crescent—a geographical land arc emanating from Iran to 
Lebanon through Iraq and Syria where the region’s Shia population is concentrated—that 
could be controlled by Iran-backed non-state actors have nurtured Saudi Arabia’s warming 
attitude towards Israel because of the ideological and military threat Iran poses to them 
both.229 There is not a substantive body of reporting to suggest that Israel aids Saudi Arabia 
in combatting its domestic Iran-backed Shia unrest. However, Mossad—one of Israel’s 
primary intelligence services—has long provided Saudi Arabia with intelligence 
information and equipment that arguably could be used by the Saudi monarchy to identify 
and target Iranian-backed internal threats.230 Even if Israel is not directly assisting the 
Saudis to quell internal dissent, providing Saudi the means to do so indirectly contributes 
to Saudi maintaining its political power, and fosters positive relations between the two 
states.  
External to Saudi Arabia, both the Kingdom and Israel desire to eradicate Iran’s 
influence over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Israel benefit from Iran 
influencing the Palestinian people. Saudi Arabia loses influence as the protector of the 
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Sunni people and advocate for Palestinian self-determination, and Israel has to tackle its 
prolonged conflict with the Palestinians that is now further complicated and prolonged by 
Iranian influence and support. Iran has established a material and politically-incentivized 
client—Hamas—that allows Sunni Palestinians to increase Iran’s military advantage 
against their perceived Israeli oppressors, while inadvertently spreading Iran’s influence 
and revolutionary ideology—and thereby decreasing Saudi Arabia’s influence—
throughout the region. Iran’s public support to the Palestinians and covert proxy activities 
with Hamas allows Iran to develop an additional client relationship at the expense of 
Saudi’s regional influence.  
Iran is building its reputation as a defender of non-Shia Islamic co-religionists (at 
the expense of Saudi Arabia) and expanding its influence within Israel’s borders by 
supporting the Palestinians—a dynamic that is unpalatable to both Saudi Arabia and Israel. 
Between March and May 2021, Ayatollah Khamenei and Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif 
made over 45 statements on their social media platforms, “proudly [standing] with [the] 
Palestinian people—who resist the brutality of an apartheid regime.”231 Furthermore, 
during a televised speech in early May 2021 in recognition of Iran’s annual Quds Day—a 
day of protest on the last Friday of Ramadan to express solidarity with the Sunni 
Palestinians and opposition to Israel—Ayatollah Khamenei declared it an Iranian “public 
duty to fight against [Israel],” as the “fight against oppression and the fight against 
terrorism.”232 Saudi and Israel cooperating against Iran’s influence of the Palestinian 
people is a tall order, since Saudi Arabia regularly condemns Israel’s policies and actions 
directed against the Palestinians. Any cooperative efforts in this arena would have to be 
discreet and out of the public sphere to not tarnish Saudi’s religious obligations to the 
Palestinians. If nothing else, Iran’s relationship of convenience with Hamas remains a 
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mutual frustration for Saudi Arabia and Israel that could drive cooperation in other military 
and diplomatic activities that curb Iran’s overall influence in the region.  
2. Iran Advances Its Nuclear Program 
Scholars agree that shared concerns about Iran’s nuclear program drive diplomatic 
and military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel.233 In response to Iran’s 
reinvigoration of its nuclear program, Saudi Arabia and Israel have shared intelligence, 
Israel has upgraded Saudi Arabia’s intelligence surveillance equipment, and Saudi has 
approved overflight permissions for the Israelis in support of their strike operations against 
Iran’s nuclear facilities.234 If Iran continues to advance its nuclear program without any 
form of rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the strategic context of Saudi 
Arabia and Israel’s pragmatic relationship endures to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
weapon.235 
The impending renegotiation of the JCPOA agreement complicates Saudi Arabia 
and Israel’s strategic cooperation, and depending on the renegotiation terms, has the 
potential to either expand or derail their warming relations. In June 2021, Israeli Prime 
Minister Naftali Bennett expressed Israel’s staunch opposition to renegotiating JCPOA in 
June 2021, echoing his predecessor Benjamin Netanyahu’s belief that a renegotiated 
JCPOA would have disastrous consequences for Israeli national security.236 Saudi Arabia 
is more amenable to reinvigorating the JCPOA deal than Israel is, but advocates for a 
longer-lasting nuclear deal with stronger parameters that limits all three of Iran’s strategic 
programs.237 A JCPOA renegotiation hypothetically could reinforce Saudi Arabia and 
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Israel’s strategic cooperation against Iran if the new agreement lifts economic sanctions 
against Iran without strictly regulating Iran’s nuclear program, as well as without reining 
in Iran’s proxy forces across the region.  
It is unclear how Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship would respond to Iran 
enriching uranium to 90 percent and successfully creating a nuclear weapon that it could 
effectively deliver against its enemies. At the very least, Saudi Arabia and Israel would 
both feel less secure as Iran’s security drastically increases with the attainment of a nuclear 
bomb. It would be far easier for Saudi and Israel to cooperate in military attacks against 
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure now—through cyber means or air strikes—while Iran has 
latent nuclear capability than it would be for the two countries to cooperate against a 
nuclear-armed Iran. Israel at least maintains a form of nuclear deterrence against Iran by 
being a nuclear power, but Saudi Arabia does not have that luxury. Saudi Arabia is not a 
nuclear power and does not have a nuclear security guarantor to make assurances of its 
safety. In the scenario that Iran gets the bomb, Saudi Arabia would have to make a choice 
to either pursue its own nuclear weapons or convince another nuclear power to bring Saudi 
under its nuclear umbrella, which leads into multiple scenarios that could inhibit Saudi’s 
cooperation with Israel.  
3. MBS Becomes King 
If MBS ascends to the Saudi throne, Saudi’s rapprochement with Israel could 
accelerate because MBS would be less constrained by traditional barriers to cooperation 
with Israel.238 As the Crown Prince, MBS is second in line to the throne and expected to 
succeed his father, King Salman. However, MBS’s succession is not guaranteed. While 
MBS has enacted rapid and radical restructuring of the Saudi governance system that 
increases the monarchy’s political and religious power, MBS is still forced to navigate 
through considerations of family in-fighting and power moves, domestic opinion, and most 
importantly the backing of the religious establishment.239 MBS’s rise to Crown Prince 
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angered many of the other royals—those who were passed over in succession to the throne, 
those who have been silenced, or those who viewed his leadership and outlook as 
dangerous to the monarchy—and drew negative attention to the entire ruling family for his 
military campaign in Yemen and connection to the murder of journalist Jamaal 
Khashoggi.240 If MBS ascends the throne after his father dies, he will still be required to 
honor the House of Saud’s alliance with the Wahhabi clergy to maintain the monarchy’s 
political legitimacy. However, he will be less constrained by royal family politics as his 
seniority and authority will no longer be in question.  
While King Salman is still alive, MBS must maintain his father’s confidence and 
endorsement to avoid being replaced by a less controversial, and perhaps less ambitious 
prince that could derail cooperative ties with Israel. However, King Salman is 85 years old 
and his health and mental acuity are in decline. MBS has positioned himself as the 
gatekeeper to the king and the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia. If anything would have 
convinced King Salman to replace MBS, it likely would have been MBS’s association with 
Khashoggi’s murder due to the extraordinary international blowback on the Kingdom. 
However, MBS retained his father’s endorsement, has sidelined royal opposition, and 
overhauled the religious establishment to largely endorse his political aspirations, 
including the slow process of acclimating the Saudi people to increased religious tolerance 
in favor of the Jewish state.241  
4. Economic Cooperation with Israel 
A mutually beneficial economic partnership between Saudi Arabia and Israel is a 
solid foundation for creating deep-rooted ties that could accelerate rapprochement between 
the two countries.242 Diversifying Saudi’s revenue sources and mining for natural 
resources—such as gold, phosphate and uranium—are integral to overhauling Saudi’s 
economy and establishing the Kingdom as an epicenter of trade, which Israel is fully 
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qualified to address.243 Cooperating with Israel on small economic projects could build to 
cooperating with Israel on large economic projects that foster interconnectedness over 
time. Israel and Saudi would mutually benefit under a neoliberal institutionalist idea of 
economic interdependence where economic ties slowly build to political ties over time due 
to the increasing disadvantage to fighting wars with economic partners.244 
5. Saudi Arabia Prosecutes Extremist Ideology and Promotes Religious 
Tolerance 
MBS’s energized initiatives to counter extremist ideology and organizations 
throughout the region underscores Saudi and Israel’s common interest in fighting terrorism. 
Israel traditionally viewed Saudi Arabia as a fanatical religious state and sponsor of 
terrorism, due largely to its past financial support to the Palestinians and its connections to 
9/11.245 However, Saudi has drastically changed its stance on terrorism—both home 
grown and abroad. Additionally, there is not a significant body of reporting to suggest that 
Saudi and Israel currently cooperate in counterterrorism operations beyond intelligence 
sharing, military sales and Saudi overflight permissions for Israeli military aircraft.246 
Nonetheless, developing mutual trust in small scale military activities can build to 
cooperating on larger military objectives, and the lack of information on Saudi and Israel’s 
current military cooperation could largely be a result of the secretive nature of their joint 
operations.247 Regardless, their compatibility as counterterrorism partners is an area of 
academia that would benefit from additional scholarship. Additionally, leveraging the 
religious establishment to guide Saudi citizens away from anti-Semitic cultural bigotry 
would allow the Saudi monarchy to maintain its religious and political credibility in 
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increasing its cooperative counterterrorism initiatives, and broader political relationship 
with Israel.248  
6. Saudi Arabia Abandons the Palestinian Cause 
While Saudi’s demands for Palestinian self-determination appear intractable, there 
is evidence of subtle changes within Saudi leadership and domestic public opinion that 
could at the very least change the parameters of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. There is 
a qualitative shift and greater sensitivity in Riyadh’s recognition of the of the Jewish state’s 
legitimacy and its security concerns.249 Influential Saudis have become more open in their 
dealings with Israel and demonstrated “thinly veiled support” for Israel’s response to 
Palestinian activities.250 Additionally, MBS’s lack of sympathy for the Palestinians, 
compounded by his commitment to eradicating extremist ideology from the region and the 
religious establishment’s push for religious tolerance, lowers Saudi’s traditional barriers to 
cooperation with Israel out of loyalty to the Palestinian people. The right combination of 
reform initiatives, coupled with Hamas increasing its terrorist activities and ties to Iran 
could change this dynamic in Israel’s favor.  
7. The United States Withdraws from the Middle East 
U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East could galvanize cooperation between 
Saudi Arabia and Israel if the other two primary drivers of cooperation—mutual concern 
with Iran and Saudi’s reform initiatives—remain unscathed because Saudi and Israel share 
significant common interests in their desire for security, peace, and economic prosperity in 
the region. MBS has verbalized tremendous admiration for Israel and their mutual interests, 
and is not threatened by Israel in the region’s current balance of power configuration.251 
If the Biden administration shrinks the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, 
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withdraws its support to Saudi’s war in Yemen, and distances itself both politically and 
militarily with Saudi Arabia, the consequences could be similar to Saudi and Israel’s 
response to the Obama administration’s disaffection with Saudi Arabia. Saudi and Israel 
could continue to cooperate on narrow military objectives until a friendlier U.S. 
administration comes into power.  
8. The United States Fosters Better Relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Israel 
The United States has historically exhibited a moderating effect between Saudi 
Arabia and Israel that has reduced their mutual hostility over time.252 Losing the United 
States as a security guarantor deepens Saudi’s feelings of insecurity, but the United States 
could still influence how Saudi responds to that renewed sense of insecurity.253 The Biden 
administration has clearly articulated that it will continue to support both Saudi Arabia 
outside of the Yemen war, as well as Israel, but has renewed its focus on democratic values 
that conflict with Saudi and Israel’s human rights records against journalists and the Shia 
minority in Saudi, and the Palestinians in Israel.254 The United States is limiting its military 
footprint, but not its influence. However, it “must find a way to pair reductions in military 
commitments with gains in regional stability.”255 The Biden administration can champion 
democratic values and encourage a meaningful relationship between its two largest partners 
in the region—Saudi Arabia and Israel—as part of securing regional stability in the absence 
of a U.S. footprint.  
 
252 Abadi, “Saudi Arabia’s Rapprochement with Israel: The National Security Imperatives,” 446. 
253 Bostock, “Saudi Arabia Is Trying to Patch Things up with Bitter Rivals Iran and Turkey, Showing 
MBS Knows the U.S. Isn’t Batting for Him Anymore.” 
254 Shaun Tandon, “Reframing Mideast, Biden Seems to Signal New Distance from Allies Israel, 
Saudis,” The Times of Israel, February 6, 2021, https://www.timesofisrael.com/reframing-mideast-biden-
takes-new-distance-from-allies-israel-saudi-arabia/. 
255 Vali Nasr and Maria Fantappie, “How Iran and Saudi Arabia Can Together Bring Peace to the 
Middle East,” August 5, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2021-08-03/how-iran-and-
saudi-arabia-can-together-bring-peace-middle-east. 
58 
B. CONDITIONS THAT INHIBIT SAUDI ARABIA’S COOPERATION 
WITH ISRAEL  
Conversely, if the regional balance of power changes to increase the security of 
Saudi Arabia or Israel at the expense of the other, the strategic context of their cooperation 
would change, likely for the worse. Additionally, while MBS’s reform initiatives have 
significant potential to further cooperative ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel, they are 
also fragile and susceptible to disruption. Rapprochement between the Kingdom and 
Jewish State would severely suffer, and their relationship could revert to historical 
animosity and adversarial tension if MBS does not ascend the Saudi throne as king and/or 
the Kingdom defaults on its reform initiatives. Lastly, as the United States distances itself 
from its Saudi client, the Kingdom could increase its political and military standing in the 
region by reconciling with previous rivals such as Iran—whose ideological values do not 
align with Saudi and whose partnership would isolate Saudi from Israel, but would 
guarantee Saudi’s physical security. Similarly to conditions that would promote increased 
cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, it is also unclear how many of these variables 
need to be actualized, or in what order they need to be actualized to completely derail a 
cooperative relationship between the two countries. However, progress of any of these 
variables will undoubtedly impede Saudi and Israel’s existing and future cooperative 
efforts. 
1. Saudi Arabia Pursues a Nuclear Weapon 
Saudi Arabia considered developing its own nuclear weapons program as a 
deterrent against Iran long before the breakdown of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
Action (JCPOA), and Iran’s subsequent decision to reenergize it nuclear enrichment 
program.256 In 2010, late Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz reportedly stated to U.S. 
officials that “if Iran succeeds in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region 
would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.”257 While Saudi Arabia and Israel’s strategic 
cooperation endures against Iran, Israel does not support Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of a 
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nuclear weapons program and would disrupt progress in their cooperation initiatives 
because Israel is concerned with maintaining its military advantage.258 While Saudi Arabia 
and Israel are on good terms now, Israel is concerned that if the Saudi monarchy were 
overthrown, Saudi’s nuclear weapons would be refocused towards Israel by a hostile 
replacement regime.259 Saudi Arabia began investing in the physical infrastructure, human 
capital, and technology required for a large-scale nuclear power program following the 
international community’s 2015 adoption of the JCPOA agreement.260 Even if Iran had 
not reinvigorated its nuclear enrichment program following the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from 
JCPOA, the agreement only stalled Iran’s nuclear program for 15 years.261 Saudi Arabia 
had already planned to pursue a latent nuclear weapons capacity as part of its longer term 
nuclear hedging strategy against Iran.262 Saudi framed the nuclear program investment as 
part of a peaceful energy diversification plan. However, its development of a latent nuclear 
capacity most notably aligned with a decade-old warning that it would pursue nuclear 
weapons in response to Iran’s development of nuclear weapons.263  
It is possible (but unlikely in the current political environment) that a nuclear Saudi 
Arabia could deter Iran from regional aggression and thereby extend Israel’s nuclear 
deterrence against Iran under an expanded cooperative arrangement with Israel.264 Or a 
nuclear Saudi Arabia could initiate a regional arms race, tip the balance of power in the 
Middle East, and jeopardize Israel’s military advantage that ensures its survival against its 
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enemies. Saudi’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program would at the very least create an 
intermission to its cooperative arrangement with Israel as Israel weighs its response 
options. All other regional dynamics remaining the same, reverting to hostility towards 
Saudi Arabia could drastically reduce the already minimal number of partners Israel has in 
the region, create a larger Arab-Israeli schism, and increase the likelihood of military 
confrontation between states. Israel is not willing to gamble on its survival and for now 
maintains a clear and consistent policy that no other Middle Eastern country should have 
nuclear weapons.265 Saudi’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon would contradict that policy, 
derail their cooperative arrangement, and reinvigorate adversarial tension between the two 
states.  
To prevent Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon, and thereby maintain Saudi 
and Israel’s cooperative arrangement, Israel likely would first seek U.S. assistance in 
curbing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear aspirations. As a lasting partner to Saudi Arabia, the United 
States could effectively intervene and either extend its nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia 
or sign a U.S. Atomic Energy Act “123 agreement” to provide the United States “enhanced 
insight and influence into the evolution of the Saudi nuclear energy program.”266 Lastly, 
Israel could offer to bring Saudi Arabia underneath its own nuclear umbrella as an effective 
strategy to roll back Saudi’s aspirational nuclear weapons program. However, this is an 
unlikely course of action that Israel is not prepared to extend. It would also be difficult to 
implement without first normalizing their relations, which is dependent on first resolving 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. None of the available options to temper Saudi Arabia’s 
nuclear ambitions are simple or straightforward. However, it is clear that Saudi Arabia’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons would radically alter its current cooperative arrangement with 
Israel, more likely for the worse. 
In the opposite direction, the effect of Saudi’s increased cooperation with Israel on 
Saudi’s nuclear ambitions is an area of academia that requires additional scholarly 
attention. It does not appear that Saudi Arabia and Israel’s cooperative arrangement has 
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drastically tempered Saudi’s nuclear ambitions because their relationship is inconsistent 
and does not extend beyond periodic opportunities to work together against Iran. The Saudi 
regime has to navigate through significant ideological barriers, such as the Palestinian 
question and the monarchy’s patriarchal tradition of animosity towards Israel, before 
feeling secure enough to abandon its nuclear aspirations in exchange for possible extended 
nuclear deterrence through Israel.267 Additionally, Israel has not conveyed a willingness 
to bring Saudi Arabia under its nuclear umbrella as an incentive for Saudi Arabia to 
comfortably abandon its nuclear ambitions. Israel likely would welcome a normalization 
agreement from Saudi Arabia, but that agreement would not surmount Israel’s skepticism 
towards the Islamic world, conditioned by decades of conflict with its neighboring 
countries.268 A relationship that allows Israel to satisfy Saudi Arabia’s underlying 
motivations for pursuing nuclear weapons is a distant prospect. Without alleviating Saudi 
Arabia and Israel’s concerns over Iran’s nuclear program and Saudi remaining non-nuclear, 
the strategic context of Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship endures.269  
2. Iran Reconciles with Saudi Arabia 
Saudi rapprochement with Iran has the most potential to derail Israel’s cooperative 
arrangement because Saudi and Israel’s mutual concern with Iran is the cornerstone of their 
relationship.270 While reconciliation with Iran runs counter to Saudi’s expressed reform 
initiatives and desire to limit Iran’s nuclear activities, Saudi and Iran engaged in secret 
diplomatic talks in April 2021, corresponding with MBS’s diplomatic campaign to repair 
relationships with Saudi’s rivals in the Middle East.271 Iran’s recent attempts to reconcile 
with Saudi Arabia directly could be indicative of Iran’s growing insecurity over Saudi’s 
increased cooperation with Israel, or part of Iran’s revolutionary strategy to decrease 
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Western influence in the region by creating separation between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States.272 Additionally, Saudi Arabia has signaled a recent willingness to negotiate 
with Iran to de-escalate tensions across the region due to inconsistent U.S. security 
guarantees, ongoing U.S. nuclear negotiations with Iran, as well as U.S. retrenchment from 
the Middle East.273 
Rapprochement with Iran could deliver immediate positive results for Riyadh by 
easing domestic pressure and military expenditures—ending the costly war in Yemen with 
the Iranian-backed Houthis, halting Iranian military attacks against Saudi infrastructure, 
expanding Saudi influence in Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, and reducing the domestic Shia 
threat in Saudi.274 However, Saudi and Iran have different short-term ambitions in their 
talks. Iran remains committed to its ongoing shadow war of assassinations, cyber-attacks 
and sabotage with Israel, and wants to obstruct Saudi and Israel from aligning against 
Iran.275 To that end, Iran wants full normalization of relations with Saudi-Arabia, but 
Riyadh wants its security concerns addressed first.276 Saudi is unlikely to commit to full 
normalization with Iran and abandoning any prospects of economic and military 
cooperation with Israel without first receiving significant concessions. 
Iran would have to significantly improve its diplomatic and military interactions 
with Saudi Arabia to convince Saudi to abandon its cooperative arrangement with Israel. 
Based on the historical rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Iranian concessions possibly 
would include a scaling back of its anti-Wahhabi rhetoric, a willingness to split the Middle 
East in terms of influencing Sunni and Shia Muslim populations, a withdrawal of proxy 
force activities that negatively impact Saudi Arabia (which Iran does not have full 
operational control over), and a willingness to establish at least neutral diplomatic relations 
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with the United States. However, conflict is integral to Iran justifying its juristic 
guardianship and maintaining its revolutionary momentum.277 It therefore seems highly 
unlikely that Iran would be able to deliver such promises since they are antithetical to Iran’s 
revolutionary ideology that upholds the Iranian regime. A more realistic scenario would be 
for Iran to maintain its revolutionary momentum, but scale back its directed efforts against 
Saudi to make room for increased diplomacy. While such a scenario likely would not offer 
enough incentive for Saudi to abandon the marginal security benefits it receives in its 
cooperative relationship with Israel, it would certainly give the relationship between Saudi 
and Israel pause. Regardless of Saudi or Iran’s motivations for reconciling, normalizing 
relations between the two countries would completely de-rail Saudi and Israel’s current 
cooperative arrangement against Iran with Saudi and Iran reconciling, while Iran and Israel 
remain in adversarial tension.  
3. MBS Does Not Become King 
Although unlikely, it is still worth noting that a replacement to MBS likely would 
not be as progressive and would instead default to traditional Arab principles that the 
monarchy, religious establishment and Saudi people have been accustomed to. Considering 
that MBS has nurtured an ironclad relationship with his father that allowed him to skip 
other royals in succession to the throne, buffer himself from royal criticism, and overhaul 
the Saudi government and religious structures to consolidate his power, the writing is on 
the wall that MBS will be the next king of Saudi Arabia. Since the Wahhabi clerical 
establishment has overseen all transitions of power and social reform within the Saudi state, 
it is always possible that a group of royals could conspire against the future king with the 
help of Wahhabi clerics that have been sidelined under MBS.278 However, MBS has 
insulated himself from royal and clerical backlash by imprisoning family members, 
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leveraging the regime-sponsored Council of Senior Scholars, and relying on the tradition 
of Al Wala’ wal Bara.’279 
4. MBS’s Reform Initiatives Fail 
If MBS does not realize his Vision 2030 Plan for Saudi Arabia, Israel will not have 
the opportunity to invest in Saudi’s economic infrastructure and slowly build political ties. 
This scenario limits the opportunities for Saudi and Israel to further their cooperation in 
palatable terms to Saudi citizens. The 2019 coronavirus pandemic hit Saudi’s economic 
sector hard with plummeting oil prices, financial market disruption, a decrease in tourism, 
and loss of production in the government and private sectors.280 Additionally, Saudi has a 
robust 70 year track record of the United States championing Saudi’s reform and tolerance 
initiatives, followed by Saudi’s default on those initiatives and relapse into ultra-
conservatism when faced with popular uprising.281 Despite increasing authoritarianism 
within Saudi, MBS has spearheaded “perhaps the most far-reaching alterations” to the 
Saudi governance system since its founding, so he may in fact be a visionary for 
moderation.282 The jury is still out as to whether his reform initiatives will result in 
economic prosperity and favorable political relations with Israel, or an authoritarian-
induced uprising similar to the Arab Spring.  
5. Saudi Arabia Reinvigorates Support to the Palestinians 
If MBS reverted to the Saudi monarchy’s traditional backing of the Palestinians via 
financial support, he would derail Saudi and Israel’s cooperative arrangement because 
Saudi in effect would be enabling an indirect Palestinian offensive against the Israelis. 
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While MBS personally lacks sympathy for the Palestinian cause, it is still a critical 
component of maintaining the Saudi monarchy’s political legitimacy—forged in their role 
as custodians of the Two Holy Mosques and protector of Muslims—because it is one of 
the few issues that arouses broad and genuine support across the Middle East and Muslim 
diaspora.283 Admittedly, this course of action is unlikely because the Saudi monarchy has 
distanced itself from the Palestinians—specifically Hamas—due to their connections to 
terrorism and Iran.284 Additionally, the Saudi monarchy has successfully balanced its 
international and religious legitimacy by harshly criticizing Israel and Hamas 
simultaneously, thereby exhibiting support to the Palestinian cause short of terrorist 
operations, while not significantly threatening Israel.285 Nonetheless, if MBS were facing 
significant domestic and international backlash from the Muslim community, and 
improved his relations with Iran that in turn would temper Hamas, Saudi’s resumption of 
financial support to the Palestinians could be a viable consideration. Whether as a solitary 
move, or coordinated effort with other drivers that inhibit Saudi’s cooperation with Israel, 
Saudi’s funding of the Palestinian cause against Israel would break down the cooperative 
arrangement between the Kingdom and Jewish state, and likely incite increased hostility 
between the two countries. 
6. The United States Withdraws from the Middle East and Abandons 
Saudi Arabia 
If the United States withdraws from the Middle East without giving Saudi Arabia 
credible assurances of its commitment to protect the Kingdom, as well as encouragement 
to work towards regional stability with other Middle Eastern states (it does not have to be 
Israel), Saudi may panic and establish strange bedfellows like Iran whose ideology is 
irreconcilable with the United States. Saudi deeply depends on the United States in 
guaranteeing its physical security. Without that promise, Saudi is vulnerable to malign 
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actors, making this course of action a wild card. With all other factors constant, U.S. 
abandonment of Saudi could further push Saudi towards Israel in a realist balance-of-power 
scramble against Iran. Alternatively, it could inspire a Saudi nuclear program or 
normalization of relations with Iran that diminish Israel’s sense of security and cripple any 
pre-existing cooperative arrangement.  
7. The United States Improves Relations with Iran 
If the United States repairs its diplomatic relationship with Iran or encourages Saudi 
and Iran to normalize relations, Saudi Arabia and Israel’s cooperative relationship would 
shatter because Israel would be the lone scapegoat against Iranian aggression. Right now 
there is a significant push within academia that Washington can bring peace to the Middle 
East by encouraging dialogue between “the region’s two most consequential antagonists: 
Iran and Saudi Arabia.”286 However, this idea is short-sighted and relies on the assumption 
that decreasing the U.S. presence from the region would alleviate tensions and lead to a 
regional security architecture between the major power players. While the U.S. “Twin 
Pillar” policy—heavily relying on security cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Iran to 
protect U.S. interests in the region—worked in the 1970s, the 1979 Revolution transformed 
Iran’s entire governing structure into a hyper conservative anti-American and anti-Israeli 
apparatus.287 Also, what happens to Israel if the United States, Saudi and Iran reconcile 
their deep seated differences—at least on the surface? It should also be noted that the 
Iranian regime and revolutionary ideology do not benefit from rapprochement with the 
United States and its partners because its campaigns against them are a testament to its 
domestic population of the legitimacy of its revolutionary ideology, which secures the 
regime from being overthrown.288 This short-sighted course of action would shatter the 
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developing relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel by leaving Israel as the last 
scapegoat standing for Iran.  
C. MACRO INTERACTION BETWEEN CAUSAL MECHANISMS 
This chapter explored the conditions in which the main drivers of Saudi cooperation 
with Israel—mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s secular reform initiatives, and U.S. 
influence—could individually promote or inhibit future cooperative initiatives in a highly 
dynamic political environment. More broadly, the analysis also suggests that as one category 
of drivers promotes or inhibits cooperation in its own sphere of influence, it also impacts the 
ability of the other two categories of drivers to promote or inhibit cooperation. This macro 
dynamic is evident in the following scenarios:  
1. An increased Iranian threat to Saudi Arabia can increase U.S. influence as 
either a security guarantor or moderator between Saudi Arabia and Israel.  
2. As MBS’s religious reform initiatives accelerate to promote cooperation 
with Israel, Iran’s ideological threat increases to both Saudi and Israel. 
3. Decreased U.S. influence in the Middle East increases Saudi and Israel’s 
perception of the Iranian threat in the absence of the United States as a 
security guarantor.  
4. U.S. influence decreases as Saudi and Israel secure alternate security 
arrangements to address an increased Iranian threat in the absence of the 
United States as a security guarantor. 
The main drivers of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel are not comparable 
in terms of strength or in the direction in which they promote or inhibit cooperation between 
Saudi Arabia and Israel. For example, as Saudi accelerates its reform initiatives, U.S. 
influence on the relationship between Saudi and Israel does not necessarily change. However, 
the dynamics of how these drivers singularly impact the problem set, overlaid with this macro 
perspective of the interaction between the main drivers delivers a holistic and extraordinarily 
complicated examination of why Saudi and Israel move towards and against cooperating 
with one another in pursuit of their respective ambitions across the Middle East.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis investigated why Saudi Arabia has increased its diplomatic negotiations 
and cooperation with Israel during the 21st century, after decades of animosity between the 
two countries. Initial research on the topic also triggered the smaller, but related question 
as to whether or not this increased cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel signaled a 
viable pathway to official normalization of relations in light of the UAE, Bahrain, and 
Sudan establishing full normalization with Israel in 2020. These normalization agreements 
focused international attention on the historic tension associated with Arab states 
establishing relations with Israel, and whether Saudi would follow suit. Since Israel’s 
inception in 1948, the legitimacy of its existence has been contested by Saudi Arabia. The 
contention emerges from Israel’s policies toward Palestinians and occupation of 
Palestinian territory, including the holy city of Jerusalem. After decades of exchanging 
harsh rhetoric and Israel’s human rights record against Palestinians, it appeared strange 
that Saudi Arabia had increased cooperation with a country that many of its people and 
allies view as an enemy of Islam and the Arab people.  
This disconnect allowed for an investigation of the most salient variables that have 
encouraged Saudi Arabia to potentially jeopardize its own legitimacy by cooperating with 
Israel over the last two decades—mutual concern with Iran, Saudi reform initiatives under 
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and U.S. influence (or lack thereof). 
This thesis concludes that in the present configuration—and in line with scholars on the 
subject—that the drivers of Saudi’s cooperation initiatives with Israel collectively have not 
stimulated a viable path to normalization of relations that circumvents the barrier of 
Palestinian self-determination. In April 2021, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al 
Saud stated that “it would be extremely helpful economically, socially, and from a security 
perspective” to normalize Israel’s status in the region, and that “normalizing ties with Israel 
has long been part of Saudi Arabia’s vision” in exchange for Israel delivering a sovereign 
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state to the Palestinians.289 This thesis also concludes that the drivers to cooperation work 
in tandem to promote or inhibit cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and changes 
to one driver impact the salience of the other drivers. 
While there has been significant research into Saudi and Israel’s evolving 
relationship over time, scholars have largely isolated one or two of the factors that promote 
or inhibit cooperation—mutual concern with Iran, Saudi reform initiatives under Saudi 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), and U.S. influence (or lack thereof)—
without analyzing how the factors work in tandem to promote or inhibit cooperation. This 
thesis rigorously examined how those factors have interacted during the 21st century for a 
more holistic understanding of what Saudi Arabia and Israel’s relationship hinges on now 
and in the future. This thesis did not argue whether or not Saudi and Israel will normalize 
relations in the future, but instead looked at the conditions that could move the two 
countries towards or against additional cooperative initiatives that could pave a viable 
pathway towards full normalization of relations in the future.  
The first chapter encompassed an introduction of the problem set, as well as a 
literature review on the available scholarship to date that covers factors that promote or 
inhibit cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Chapter I concluded that most 
scholars agree that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the largest impediment to full 
normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and that a mutual security concern with 
Iran is the primary driver of cooperation between the two states. Chapter I also concluded 
a subtle divergence in the literature on the feasibility of normalization without Palestinian 
self-determination—split between most scholars that reject the notion that Saudi Arabia 
would ever pursue normalization before the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is settled, and a 
smaller group of scholars that acknowledge Saudi’s seemingly intractable demands for 
Palestinian self-determination, but offer evidence of subtle changes within Saudi 
leadership and domestic public opinion that could at the very least change the parameters 
of an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. Chapter II discussed the historical factors impeding 
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Saudi and Israeli normalization, to include Palestinian self-determination. Chapter III 
explored how salient Saudi and Israel’s mutual concern over Iran, Saudi’s secular reform 
initiatives, and U.S. influence has been on promoting cooperation between Saudi Arabia 
and Israel over the last two decades, short of normalization. Chapter IV then analyzed 
hypothetical conditions that would further or inhibit cooperation between Saudi Arabia and 
Israel, based on Saudi leadership statements and ongoing changes to the political 
environment.  
The research in this thesis supports the original argument by scholars that mutual 
concern with Iran, Saudi’s contemporary reform initiatives, and U.S. influence have in fact 
promoted cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel under the right circumstances, but 
to date have not collectively stimulated a viable path to normalization of relations that 
circumvents the barrier of Palestinian self-determination. Additionally, Saudi’s barriers to 
normalization with Israel are predominantly the result of an enduring Saudi Arab tradition 
of cultural bigotry against the Jewish people, and not born out of religion. Saudi’s increased 
diplomacy and cooperation with Israel in the 21st century has therefore been a balancing 
act for Saudi Arabia to further its security interests while maintaining its religious and 
political legitimacy within Saudi Arabia and the wider Muslim world. As evidence against 
the drivers to cooperation between Saudi and Israel, the research illuminated an 
inconsistency in the salience of the three drivers over time, as well as significant gaps in 
the analysis based on unknown and/or impending political changes in the Middle East. U.S. 
retrenchment from the region, a new U.S. administration, a renegotiation of the Iranian 
nuclear deal, and recent reconciliatory dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran change the 
conditions under which the three drivers towards Saudi and Israel’s cooperation are 
effective.  
The mutual concern of Iran is the most palpable and consistent driver towards Saudi 
and Israel’s cooperation. Saudi Arabia has established a pragmatic and limited strategic 
relationship with Israel to counter and deter Iran’s regional hegemonic ambitions that Iran 
realizes through its exportation of revolutionary Islam, mobilization of client militias, and 
nuclear program. These growing threats from Iran have encouraged the Saudi Kingdom to 
exchange historical animosity towards the Jewish state for strategic cooperation in the form 
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of limited military and intelligence cooperation against Iran. Saudi’s reform initiatives 
under MBS are less palpable than the Iranian threat. Nonetheless, the salience of MBS’s 
reform initiatives have driven Saudi’s desire to cooperate with Israel, based on MBS’s lack 
of sympathy for the Palestinians, as well as his commitment to eradicate extremist ideology 
from the region and increase religious tolerance within the Kingdom.290 Theoretically, 
Saudi’s reform initiatives under MBS hold immense potential to forge enduring ties with 
Israel under a neoliberal institutionalist framework in the diplomatic, information, military, 
and economic sectors. Lastly, the United States provided the initial impetus for Saudi and 
Israel to view the pragmatic benefits of coordinating their activities in the region, and 
nurtured diplomatic ties between the two states over the last several decades.291 Saudi 
Arabia and Israel base their regional security strategies on the U.S. willingness and ability 
to project strategic leadership across the region, and more importantly when the United 
States is unwilling or unable to do so.292  
Contrary to their historical animosity, Saudi and Iran engaged in secret diplomatic 
talks in April 2021, corresponding with MBS’s diplomatic campaign to repair relationships 
with Saudi’s rivals in the Middle East.293 Saudi Arabia has signaled a recent willingness 
to negotiate with Iran to de-escalate tensions across the region due to inconsistent U.S. 
security guarantees, ongoing U.S. nuclear negotiations with Iran, as well as U.S. 
retrenchment from the Middle East.294 This unfolding political development has the 
potential to render the mutual concern with Iran—the strongest driver towards Saudi and 
Israel’s cooperative initiatives—inert. Additionally, MBS’s succession to the Saudi 
kingship is not guaranteed. While MBS has enacted rapid and radical restructuring of the 
Saudi governance system that increases the monarchy’s political and religious power, MBS 
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will still have to navigate through considerations of family in-fighting and power moves, 
domestic opinion, and most importantly the backing of the religious establishment, before 
ascending the throne.295 While MBS has initiated significant reforms as Crown Prince, he 
is still beholden to the Wahhabi religious establishment that undergirds his legitimacy now 
and in the future as king. This dynamic creates impediments to quickly moving Saudi 
domestic support towards increased cooperation with Israel, and in the near term, the 
monarchy is unlikely to break its pact with its Wahhabi base because Wahhabism is 
indispensable to the monarchy’s long-term political stability.296 If MBS takes a misstep 
that empowers the royal family to sideline him with the support of the religious base, 
MBS’s progressive reform initiatives that privilege Israel likely will not be upheld by a 
more traditional replacement king.  
Lastly, U.S. influence in the Middle East in waning. Saudi Arabia and the United 
States have enjoyed a mutually beneficial—and mostly transactional—relationship based 
on the United States protecting Saudi Arabia from external attacks, weapons sales, and 
U.S. access to basing and oil. However, this relationship has ebbed and flowed over the 
course of the last two decades, with a less favorable relationship under the Obama 
administration, a reinvigorated sense of partnership under the Trump administration, and 
now a frigid, yet largely unknown arrangement with the Biden administration. Whether the 
U.S. continues to retrench itself from the region, or Saudi simply decides that it cannot 
depend on the United States to guarantee its security—even in the short term until the next 
administration takes over—U.S. influence matters less in mediating a relationship with 
Israel. In light of the array of unknown factors that impact the drivers to Saudi and Israel’s 
cooperation, the feasibility of Saudi reconciling with Iran, what Saudi reform initiatives 
would look like if MBS does not succeed his father as king, and changes in Saudi’s political 
and military actions without the United States as a security guarantor are areas of academia 
that would benefit from additional scholarship. While the barrier of Palestinian self-
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determination remains seemingly impenetrable, the two nations will continue to cooperate 
against mutually perceived threats, and towards mutually beneficial opportunities short of 
normalization as long as the strategic context of their relationship endures. However, that 
strategic context is challenged by recent changes in the political environment.  
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
The Middle East endures in its pivotal role in United States foreign policy, and 
Saudi Arabia and Israel remain the most capable and willing partners in the region to 
further U.S. national interests. The United States may decrease its military footprint and 
influence in the Middle East, but the threats to U.S. national security emanating from 
malign actors in the Middle East do not disappear simply because we have pivoted to a 
more pressing problem set, such as great power competition. U.S. actions and inactions 
have consequences. U.S. retrenchment from the Middle East could create a power vacuum 
and instigate shifting balances of power in the absence of a viable alternate framework to 
uphold favorable dynamics in the region to the United States. Saudi and Israel are drawn 
closer together by a mutually perceived threat of Iran, Saudi reform initiatives, and U.S. 
influence as a moderator between the two countries. If the United States removes itself as 
a driver of cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, the two countries will pursue 
avenues that guarantee their own security interests, and those avenues may not be together 
and may not be in line with U.S. values. It would be a good news story for Saudi Arabia 
and Israel to continue their trajectory of cooperation without U.S. influence as a driver, but 
removing U.S. influence impacts the salience of the other two drivers as well. The United 
States cannot abandon its traditional partners in the Middle East while simultaneously 
dictating the manner in which those partners scramble to guarantee their security in the 
absence of the United States as their traditional security guarantor. If cooperation towards 
normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel remains compatible with 
furthering U.S. policy in the Middle East, the United States should focus on reinvigorating 
both its bilateral and multilateral relationships with Saudi Arabia and Israel to promote 
common objectives, decrease confusion on the U.S. role in the region, and circumvent 
unintended consequences of retrenching without a solid foreign policy plan that is vetted 
by our network of allies and partners.  
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